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POST SURRENDER TASKS  
SECTION E OF THE  
REPORT TO THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF  
BY THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER  
SOUTH EAST ASIA  
1943 - 1945

VICE-ADMIRAL THE EARL MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA

LONDON: HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE

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**POST SURRENDER TASKS**

Section E of the

**REPORT TO THE COMBINED  
CHIEFS OF STAFF**

By the Supreme Allied Commander

**SOUTH EAST ASIA  
1943-1945**

**VICE-ADMIRAL THE EARL MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA  
K.G., P.C., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., G.C.V.O., K.C.B., D.S.O.**



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#### NOTE

The page numbers, map numbers, appendices and annexure carry straight on from the end of the published Report to The Combined Chiefs of Staff by the Supreme Allied Commander South-East Asia 1943-45.

The front cover and the title page indicate that the Report covers 1943-45, but the Post Surrender Tasks extended into 1946.

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## 1968 PREFACE

### BY ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET THE EARL MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA

When I prepared my despatches immediately after the war I included a section on Post-Surrender tasks. Many of the problems to which I referred and with which we were called upon to grapple at that time, involved the interests and policies of allied and other Governments and remained unresolved for many years after the completion of my report. This section was, therefore, subject to political considerations not applicable to the rest of my narrative, and H.M. Government accordingly having decided that it would be inappropriate for it to appear in the main volume when published in 1951, have only recently approved its publication.


The nine month period I remained in Supreme Command in South East Asia after the Japanese surrender was, in many respects, more difficult and a more testing time than during the war. Personnel of S.O.E.'s Force 136 in Malaya had ensured that we were well informed of what was happening there; but everywhere else in the re-occupied theatre there was a complete lack of reliable intelligence, and this applied particularly to the Netherlands East Indies, which were only transferred to me at the time of the surrender from General MacArthur's South West Pacific Command.

My first and foremost task was the recovery of the Allied prisoners-of-war and internees; a difficult task at the best of times but complicated immeasurably in the Netherlands East Indies by the situation created when the Japanese allowed the 'Independent Republic of Indonesia' to be set up before we took over.

Everywhere there was a great shortage of food following the ravages of war and only in Siam was there any considerable surplus of rice, the exporting of which, and the provision of the necessary shipping, caused much trouble.

In Malaya, apart from the shortage of food, relations between the Chinese and the Malay populations were not easy; fresh arrangements had to be made with the Sultans; and plans for an early transfer to civil control were needed. In French Indo China the decision to divide the country on the 16th parallel, and put the North under Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek, caused great difficulty at the time and sowed the seed for even greater conflicts in the years to come.

I welcome publication of this Section not only for purposes of historical record as making available at long last the full text of my official report, but also as a means of recalling just how difficult, urgent and complex the tasks were which our forces were called upon to carry out and, how well they met the challenge.

  
A.F.





## SYNOPSIS

### E. POST-SURRENDER TASKS



*Page 282*

Assumption of additional responsibilities; Siam and French Indo-China re-occupied; A.P.W.I. supplies distributed in Java, Sumatra, the Andamans, and Hong Kong; Overall shortage of food; Overall shortage of shipping.



*Page 286*

20 Indian Division begins to arrive in F.I.C.; Control of Field Marshal Terauchi's Headquarters established; Independent Republic of Viet Nam declared; Sporadic fighting in Saigon; Proclamation by Major-General Gracey; *Coup d'état* by French authorities; Chiefs of Staff revise their instructions; Strong action to secure further key-points; Arrival of General Leclerc; Trouble in Cambodia averted; Arrival of Vice-Admiral d'Argenlieu.



*Page 290*

Situation in Java unexpectedly tense; Independent Republic of Indonesia declared; Netherlands authorities urged to negotiate; S.E.A.C. Director of Intelligence sent to London; 23 Indian Division begins to arrive in Java; Arrival of companies of the N.E.I. Army; Murder of Brigadier Mallaby; Fighting in Sourabaya; Demilitarisation of N.I.C.A.; Dr. Logemann's statement; Situation deteriorates; Policy regarding reprisals; Course 'Y' decided on; Discipline of Netherlands troops; Evacuation of A.P.W.I. and Japanese begun.



*Page 299*

Situation clears in F.I.C.; Personal surrender of Field Marshal Terauchi; 20 Indian Division withdrawn; Field Marshal Terauchi transferred to Singapore; No trouble experienced in Siam; Sumatra also quiet.



*Page 302*

Move of S.E.A.C. group of headquarters to Singapore; Administrative problems; Food shortage; Inter-racial clashes; Series of strikes called in Singapore; Policy directive for Military Administration; General Strike called; Warning issued; Commemorative Strike called; Ten Chinese arrested, but their deportation not enforced; Hand-over Commission set up; Visit of Pandit Nehru; H.E. Lord Killearn arrives; Singapore and the Malayan Union revert to civil government; H.E. Mr. Malcolm Macdonald arrives.



*Page 311*

Lord Inverchapel arrives in Java; Situation clears; Netherlands forces reintroduced; Discussions regarding transfer of N.E.I. to Netherlands authorities; Sarawak returned to Rajah; Delay in handing over Brunei, Labuan and North Borneo; Repatriation of British and Indian forces; Shipping shortage; Repatriation of Japanese, for which General of the Army MacArthur makes shipping available; Trials of War Criminals.

POSTSCRIPT: Lieut.-General Stopford made Acting S.A.C.; Decision to retain responsibility for N.E.I. until November; South-East Asia Command closes down on the 30th November 1946.



On the 15th August 1945 I had assumed the additional responsibilities for a greatly enlarged South-East Asia Command.<sup>1</sup> In British territory alone, the inhabitants now numbered more than twenty millions; while forty-five millions in Java, eight millions in Sumatra, eleven millions in the remaining Netherlands East Indies, and some sixteen millions in Southern French Indo-China had also to be taken into consideration. Including Siam, the population of the enlarged Command totalled more than 128,000,000 people. The Combined Chiefs of Staff had added half-a-million square miles of land to the million square miles that the Command had already covered: and throughout this vast area there existed no reliable civil police, and (except in Siam) no civil government with even a shadow of independent administration.

2. It was estimated that the area contained 122,700 Allied Prisoners of War and Internees (A.P.W.I.), to be safeguarded and given relief until they could be recovered. The prisoners of war alone totalled more than 80,000, distributed in some 250 camps; and 30,000 imported labourers (mostly Indian, Malay, and Chinese) were found on the Burma-Siam railway: survivors of an estimated 150,000. The very early provision of help to these unfortunate people was my first concern; but they were scattered in their tens of thousands from Siam and Indo-China in the north to the Netherlands East Indies in the south, and it was difficult to obtain information about them. What was certain, however, was that their condition was desperate; the death-rate among them was known to be high, and it was clear that it would increase unless food and medical supplies could be quickly provided, together with adequate protection.

3. But immediate assistance to them had to be carefully balanced against the danger to our forces (and therefore to the A.P.W.I. themselves) if they were too widely dispersed before it was certain that the Japanese would not resist us. There were nearly three-quarters of a million Japanese (including Formosans and Koreans) in the enlarged Command.<sup>2</sup> Of these, 633,000 were armed forces, 93,000 were

Japanese civilians (including those attached to the forces) and 10,000 were Formosan and Korean troops and civilians. My object was to disarm and concentrate these numbers at convenient points from which they could eventually be repatriated. As a result of the meeting at Rangoon on the 27th August, at which it had become obvious that the Japanese would obey my orders, I decided that certain risks could be taken. The moment that Singapore was secured, I began to deploy some 350,000 men (which were the mobile troops that could be spared from Burma, Ceylon, and other bases); as well as a fleet of some 120 ships, and an air force of some 50 R.A.F. squadrons.

4. But it was clear that neither these forces nor the lift at my disposal were adequate to secure the speedy, orderly re-establishment of civil governments, the evacuation of some 100,000 A.P.W.I., the round-up of the three-quarters of a million Japanese scattered over the area,<sup>3</sup> and the safekeeping of Japanese explosives, munitions and weapons, which totalled millions of tons. I therefore had no alternative but to instruct the Japanese, through their Supreme Commander, to maintain order in the areas for which they had been responsible up to the termination of hostilities, until they were relieved of that responsibility. For this purpose, I maintained the existing Japanese Chain of Command, through their Supreme Commander, to publish and enforce my orders. I consider that if the Japanese Chain of Command had been disrupted for fear that it might provide the enemy Commanders with a means of controlling their forces in resisting us—before we had fully replaced it with our own, it would have been impossible for us to use their forces for our own purposes as effectively as we did.

5. On the 3rd September, the Tactical Headquarters of 7 Indian Division,<sup>4</sup> and 207 Military Mission to the Siamese Army,<sup>5</sup> were flown in to Don Muang (Bangkok) airfield; and H.Q. Allied Land Forces, Siam (ALFSIAM), was formed at Bangkok. On the 6th, a brigade of 7 Indian Division and two complete hospital staffs began to be lifted by air; and by the 9th, 9,000 A.P.W.I. had been flown out from Siam in aircraft returning to Rangoon after landing occupation forces. The whole of 7 Indian Division was then moved in, the majority by air and the remainder by sea. Minesweeping was successfully carried out, and the river was opened by the middle of September. In French Indo-China, the Recovery of A.P.W.I. presented little difficulty. There were not many in the

<sup>1</sup> See Map 36 (facing page 181) and Map 38 (facing page 282)

<sup>2</sup> Burma 72,000; Andamans & Nicobars 20,000; Siam 118,000; Malaya & Singapore 122,000; Southern French Indo-China 72,000; Sumatra 75,000; Java 73,000; Borneo 33,000; Lesser

Sundas 25,000; Outer N.E.I. & Dutch New Guinea 123,000.


<sup>3</sup> See Annexure '2'.

<sup>4</sup> Under Major-General G. I. C. Evans.

<sup>5</sup> Under Brigadier Wilson-Brand.

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**THE COMPARATIVE DISTANCE OF  
S.E.A.C. BOUNDARIES**




MILES 0 500 1000 MILES

ORIGINAL S.E.A.C. BOUNDARY

ADDITIONAL AREA TO S.E.A.C.  
15 AUGUST 1945

EUROPE & MIDDLE EAST SHOWN IN FAINT BROWN





country; and maximum use was made of aircraft returning from the fly-in of the S.A.C.S.E.A. Control Commission and the Tactical Headquarters of 20 Indian Division,<sup>1</sup> for evacuating as many as were fit to make the trip to Rangoon. In the peak period between the 3rd and the 12th September, in spite of monsoon conditions and very long ranges, 8,106 A.P.W.I. were evacuated by air from Siam and French Indo-China.

6. Meanwhile, there were disturbing accounts of the conditions of A.P.W.I. in Java, where it was at first only possible to drop supplies and a few relief personnel in the western part of the island. It was decided that as soon as a safe channel had been swept, and before any Allied forces were landed, *H.M.S. Cumberland* (with a 'Mercy' ship carrying relief supplies) should be sent to Batavia. On the 15th September, the *Cumberland* flying the flag of Rear-Admiral W. R. Patterson, with two frigates, minesweepers, and L.C.I. (L.) in company, met Japanese naval officers off Tanjong Priok (the port for Batavia); and after the Japanese-swept channel had been searched by the 6th and 7th Minesweeping Flotillas, the *Cumberland* and ships in company anchored off the port. Two merchant ships (one from Singapore and one from Balikpapan, Borneo, which was at present in the Australian zone) were then sent with supplies to Batavia as quickly as possible; on their arrival after the supplies had been distributed, all A.P.W.I. within reach of the capital were evacuated. The Japanese, except in a few individual cases, were co-operative; and were found to be scrupulously discharging all their duties except one: they were not keeping public order. Armed bands of Indonesians were roaming the town, and were intimidating the A.P.W.I. in their camps; but as soon as Rear-Admiral Patterson impressed on the Japanese authorities their responsibility in this matter, they moved more troops into Batavia, set up road-blocks, and resumed control of the town.

7. In Sumatra,<sup>2</sup> the A.P.W.I. were mainly held in areas which could be reached from the ports of Emmahaven, Belawan, and Palembang. On the 15th September, my Director of Medical Services (Major-

General T. O. Thompson), my R.A.F. Medical Adviser (Group Captain J. Hill), and Lady Louis Mountbatten,<sup>3</sup> flew to Pakan Baroe and visited the three camps in Central Sumatra. The condition of the prisoners here, and at Palembang which they next visited, was deplorable: deaths from malnutrition and deficiency diseases averaged more than a dozen a day. Major-General Thompson flew back to Singapore to arrange with the Naval, Air, and R.A.P.W.I.<sup>4</sup> Control commanders that evacuation by air, river, and sea should be organised, with over-riding priority; while Lady Louis stayed to help in organising the camps. Prisoners of war were sent by river-craft down the Syak River from Pakan Baroe to Benkalis, where L.C.I. (L.) were waiting to take them to Singapore,<sup>5</sup> and those concentrated at Palembang were flown out direct by all available R.A.F. aircraft and by the R.A.A.F. Transport Squadron which had been flown from Australia.

8. On the 26th September, *H.M.I.S. Narbada* and a 'Mercy' ship arrived off Port Blair in the Andaman Islands, where they were met by Japanese naval officers and directed to a safe anchorage. Supplies and medical stores were landed, and were distributed to the inhabitants and to the A.P.W.I., with the help of the Japanese. Ten days later, the reoccupation forces landed without incident; Car Nicobar and the Nicobar Islands were also reoccupied, and the outlying islands searched for surviving A.P.W.I.—but the sweeping of ports and anchorages could not at once be undertaken, owing to the urgency of sweeping operations elsewhere in the theatre. Between the first landings in Malaya however, and the 25th November, 96,575 A.P.W.I. were to be recovered within the Command: most of these were moved to Singapore and Rangoon for medical attention, being then repatriated to their homes by sea.

9. Hong Kong had been reoccupied on the 12th September; although the Colony did not form part of S.E.A.C., I was responsible for providing its ground and air forces, equipment, stores and food.<sup>6</sup> I had therefore diverted 3 Commando Brigade,<sup>7</sup> which was originally intended for the ZIPPER force, as well as an

<sup>1</sup> See 'B', paragraph 647. The designation of the Commission was changed in October to "H.Q., S.A.C.S.E.A. Commission No. 1". See also paragraph 21.

<sup>2</sup> See Map 39 (between pages 283-284).

<sup>3</sup> In view of her experience in organising the relief of Allied Prisoners of War in Europe, I had asked the British Red Cross and St. John Joint War Organisation if they would authorise my wife, who was Superintendent-in-Chief of the Nursing Divisions of St. John, and a member of the Joint War Organisation Executive Council, to give similar aid in my theatre.

<sup>4</sup> R.A.P.W.I. stands for Recovery of Allied Prisoners of War and Internees.

<sup>5</sup> With the help of the Japanese, all Dutch A.P.W.I. were


concentrated in Medan, Padang, and Palembang by early November.

<sup>6</sup> On the 30th August, Admiral Fraser had sent a naval force from the British Pacific Fleet, under Rear-Admiral Cecil Harcourt, who became H.E. the Commander-in-Chief and was responsible for military administration.


<sup>7</sup> This Brigade with a reduced Divisional Headquarters and certain ancillary units was placed under Major-General F. W. Pesting (lately commanding 36 British Division), who became C.-in-C. Land Forces, Hong Kong. [The loss of British personnel under the revised qualifications for PYTHON had forced me to combine 2 and 36 British Divisions; which became 2 British Division, the only British Division left in the Command.]



MAP 39 Malaya and Sumatra




MAP 40 Siam and French Indo-China







MAP 42 The Outer Islands of the Netherlands East Indies



Air H.Q.; and in the meanwhile I had immediately despatched a rice-ship, which was loading at Rangoon at the time of the Japanese capitulation, for starvation in Hong Kong seemed imminent. Another ship, loading at Rangoon, had been immediately despatched to Malaya: for there also the food situation was serious. In fact, in many of the newly-recovered territories the populations were on the verge of starvation; and after the short-term urgency of recovering the A.P.W.I. the difficulty of feeding the vast population of South-East Asia was to be our abiding long-term problem.

10. For by the time Japan capitulated, all flow of commodities between producer and consumer countries in the 'Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere' had come to an end. The elaborate pre-war banking and exchange machinery no longer functioned; road, rail, inland water, and port facilities—without which trade and commerce are impossible—had been badly damaged; and there was an overall lack of shipping, which prevented the procurement and movement of what was still available. For three years, the production of staple foods (and especially of rice), had steadily declined: for the Japanese policy of requisitioning in exchange for worthless currency had discouraged cultivators and led to extensive hoarding. Disease in plough-cattle, and their wholesale slaughter by the Japanese, had contributed to this grave situation; and the position of those countries which had formerly imported a large proportion of their food requirements was now very serious. The Japanese authorities had in fact admitted, at the Rangoon conference on the 27th August, that stocks in the rice-deficient areas were either non-existent, or so small, that they had no idea how they could have fed the subject populations if the war had continued.

11. Fortunately, Siam and French Indo-China (and, to a smaller extent, Burma) had been found to contain stocks of rice and paddy left over from previous harvests: our first action had been to recover these and assess their size; and representatives of S.E.A.C. Economic Intelligence Division at once visited all three countries. Negotiations were begun as soon as possible with the French authorities in F.I.C., for obtaining rice; but it was at once apparent that the available surplus was small. The largest rice-producing area in S.E.A.C. was Siam; and a Rice Unit was sent there in the early stages, to make the necessary arrangements with the Siamese Government; while His Majesty's Government laid down that Siam should accept, as one of the terms of the peace agreement, to

deliver to the Allies one-and-a-half million tons of free rice.<sup>1</sup>

12. The Chief rice-deficient areas in South-East Asia were Malaya, Hong Kong, British Borneo (which was shortly to become my responsibility) and Sumatra. The problem of food procurement was manifold: it consisted in restoring confidence, and providing consumer goods as an incentive to production; obtaining physical possession of what was produced; transporting it to the ports; finding the necessary shipping to carry it to the deficient areas; and, finally, organising transport and markets for its distribution to the populations. To co-ordinate these tasks, a South-East Asia Currency and Economic Committee was set up at H.Q. A.L.F.S.E.A.; but unfortunately the shortage of food was not confined to South-East Asia, and estimated supplies from the pre-war rice-exporting countries in the theatre were included by the Washington Combined Food Board, and allocated to countries outside the theatre as well. From the first, therefore, we were called on to assume important responsibilities in procuring, allocating, and moving rice supplies—not only within S.E.A.C., but also for India, the Philippines, the French East African colonies, and U.N.R.R.A.

13. The allocation of available rice from countries within the Command to those outside it, was the responsibility of the Combined Food Board; but within S.E.A.C. also, internal allocation had to conform with the proportions approved by the Board. The Board made its first allocations on inaccurate information and without reference to my Headquarters: with the result that far more rice was allocated than was in fact available, and all allocations then had to be reduced proportionately. As a consequence of this, the rice allocated to S.E.A.C. was far less than our assessed needs: and we were forced to live on a hand-to-mouth basis and were unable to build up reserves. This meant that, in order to meet the day-to-day needs of the various countries in the theatre, a careful sub-division of the S.E.A.C. allocation had to be made, based on actual requirements and not necessarily on the proportions indicated by the Board. Sometimes this sub-division would be a sudden, emergency measure, entailing the diversion of a ship at sea; but although there were grave shortages, by this rough and ready method, actual starvation was prevented.

14. The Young Working Party,<sup>2</sup> which had been studying the problem of food and other shortages in

<sup>1</sup> This demand was eventually amended to one-and-a-quarter million tons, paid for, provided that this was delivered within a specified time.

<sup>2</sup> See 'C', paragraph 19.

the reoccupied countries, had made recommendations as to the estimated future needs of each country on its liberation; and this forward planning had proved to be of great value—though the unexpectedly sudden defeat of Japan had prevented the Working Party's findings from being applied to the greatest advantage. For the period of Military Administration, which was estimated at six months, the responsibility for procuring foodstuffs devolved on the War Office: after this, the Colonial Office (and the Burma Office) would be responsible. Since all procurement, with the exception of rice and a few unimportant items, was planned outside the Command, the responsibility of H.Q. S.A.C.S.E.A. was restricted (so far as other supplies were concerned) to the screening of requirements, the placing of demands, and (in conjunction with the War Office) the making of arrangements for stock-piling and import programmes.

15. In August, a cargo shipping fleet of some 130 ships had been available, which would have been adequate for maintaining the forces in Burma and building up forces in Malaya: but which proved quite insufficient for our new tasks. For maintenance requirements increased very greatly as the occupation forces began to be built up, and the critical food situation made it imperative that the maximum tonnage of rice should be exported from Burma and Siam—and this was a shipping commitment which had not been foreseen. The turn-round time for shipping was very long: owing partly to the increasing distances at which forces now had to be maintained; partly, also, to the long time needed for discharging ships—a factor to which the undernourishment of labour, lack of experienced supervision, slow rate of delivery of harbour-craft, and a lack of road transport all contributed.

16. By the 15th September Singapore and Malaya had been reoccupied in sufficient force to ensure the security and development of my advanced base; though what lift was available had to be carefully balanced between the build-up of Singapore and the reoccupation of further territories. With the considerable fleet of passenger transports which had been provided for ZIPPER, I had been able to make an immediate start on the deployment of forces (principally into Malaya) and the evacuation of A.P.W.I. But the large numbers of A.P.W.I. evacuated to the United Kingdom and Australia, as well as to India, had involved a steady decrease in the shipping lift available, and it was becoming increasingly difficult to move forces at a satisfactory rate into the countries for which I was responsible. Bids for movement by sea

permanently exceeded the amount of shipping at my disposal; and I was finding it necessary to make drastic cuts in planned movements, in order to meet the shipping scarcity.

17. The majority of the forces would be based on Malaya, and large quantities of stores would have to be imported for their maintenance into the advanced base at Singapore: where base storage, repair and hospital facilities were being set up. Military staff and transportation troops were established in Singapore and other ports of Malaya, so that these ports should be opened as quickly as possible; and a port organisation was established for carrying out rehabilitation. The commercial port of Singapore (unlike the naval base) had not been severely damaged; for the port plays such a large part in the economy of the Far East that when ZIPPER was being planned, my Principal Administrative Officer, Lieut.-General Wheeler, had recommended that its harbour facilities should not be bombed any more; and I had issued directions accordingly.

18. Nevertheless, the whole dock area and installations were found to be in a state of extreme dilapidation, as a result of neglect by the Japanese; while our complete lack of skilled technical labour on the spot provided a serious problem. (The renewal of electrical installations throughout the docks, for example, involved continuous day and night work by a company of engineers until the following December; and during this time the electrical installations of the Harbour Board were mainly run by Naval electrical engineers, for only one electrician of the Singapore Harbour Board was available.) The peace-time organisation for operating and managing the port was entirely absent; and in the early stages, repairs to port facilities had to be carried out entirely by military forces—while the port of Singapore itself was entirely operated by Service transportation units and personnel, and was managed under Service direction.



At the Potsdam Conference, the Combined Chiefs of Staff had allotted to S.E.A.C. that part of French Indo-China lying south of 16° North;<sup>1</sup> and by this arbitrary division the northern half of the country was occupied by Chinese forces. My specific instructions from the Chiefs of Staff were to secure control of the Supreme Headquarters of the Japanese Expeditionary Forces of the Southern

<sup>1</sup> See Map 40 (between pages 283-284).

Regions: the Headquarters of Field Marshal Count Terauchi, which was now located in Saigon. The Chiefs of Staff laid down, however, that my forces were not to occupy more of F.I.C. than would be necessary to ensure this control; and that they should be withdrawn as soon as their military task—the round-up and disarming of the Japanese, and the Recovery of A.P.W.I.—was completed. I was told that French forces, with Civil officials, would be responsible for the administration of the country, Civil administration being carried out by the French even in the key areas in which my forces would be operating.

20. This policy was agreed in the documents that General Leclerc,<sup>1</sup> representing the French Government, presented to General McArthur at Tokyo; but while willing to comply with the terms of General Order No. 1,<sup>2</sup> the French authorities asserted their sovereignty over F.I.C., and reserved the right to take whatever measures they might consider necessary—while keeping the Allied powers informed. This attitude was supported by His Majesty's Government in an agreement made with the French Government concerning F.I.C.

21. As soon as the staging-post at Bangkok was secured, forces had been flown into F.I.C., control of Field Marshal Terauchi's Headquarters established, and the S.A.C.S.E.A. Commission set up. The Commission, under Major-General Gracey, had been formed at Rangoon, where the Field Marshal's representatives had attended, so as to be able to transmit my orders to Japanese Supreme Headquarters: on the 15th September, the day following its establishment in Saigon, the Commission held its first plenary session with Field Marshal Terauchi. Reassuring leaflets had been dropped over Saigon before the initial fly-in. I had decided to bring in 20 Indian Division; with a Naval Port Party, a staging-post, and two R.A.F. Tactical Squadrons, with Air H.Q. established in Saigon. On the 13th September the fly-in of a brigade of 20 Indian Division had begun, and our troops had taken over the guarding of the airfield on the same day.

22. The day before the S.A.C.S.E.A. Commission was set up, the Chiefs of Staff had telegraphed that my authority, responsibility, and activities in F.I.C. were strictly limited and temporary. This policy would have been welcome if French forces had been on hand for supporting French responsibilities; but adequate French forces, which had been promised to me at

Potsdam, were not yet available. The only French resources I could make immediately available to General Leclerc were some 1,000 troops of the 5th Colonial Infantry Regiment (Regiment d'Infanterie Coloniale)<sup>3</sup> in Ceylon, and certain French warships, including the battleship *Richelieu*. The 9th and 3rd Colonial Infantry Divisions (Divisions d'Infanterie Coloniale)<sup>4</sup> had been detailed for F.I.C.; but they were both still in Europe, and inadequately equipped. The 1st Far East Brigade (Brigade d'Extrême-Orient), which was in Madagascar, was also destined for F.I.C.; but General Leclerc did not wish it to be phased in until after the arrival of the 9th D.I.C.—which was not to be until the first week in November. For the next six weeks, therefore, the only troops available to the French authorities outside the key areas in Southern F.I.C., would be the 1,000 troops of the 5th R.I.C., and a force of some 500 French released prisoners of war and local inhabitants.

23. On the 19th September, I signalled the Chiefs of Staff, urging them to speed up the arrival of French reinforcements: for two days previously the Annamite Independence Movement in F.I.C. (Viet Minh) had announced that Bao Dai, Emperor of Annam, had abdicated in August; and that the Annamite administration which had been set up at Hanoi (in Northern F.I.C.) was now the independent Republic of Viet Nam. A strong Independence Movement had existed in F.I.C. before the war, and had been a continual source of difficulty to the French authorities. During the occupation, this movement had been fostered by the Japanese; and the situation had been aggravated by the fact that the French administration of the country had been in the hands of representatives of the puppet government at Vichy. The spectacle of France's betrayal had greatly undermined French prestige in her colony: particularly in view of the fact that the Vichy administration in F.I.C. had at all times collaborated openly with the enemy. In March 1945, when the collapse of Germany, and the Vichy régime, seemed imminent, the Japanese had decided to assume complete control: this had caused resistance from the French Army in F.I.C., small elements of which had fought their way out into China—the remainder, however, had been placed in prisoner of war camps, and French civilians had been either interned or placed under severe restrictions. With the defeat of Japan, the Annamite Independence Movement had at once set up an administration at Hanoi, which was now under Chinese occupation; and it was this ad-

<sup>1</sup> Who, in August, had been appointed C-in-C. of the French forces in S.E.A.C., in succession to General Blaziot.

<sup>2</sup> See Appendix H.

<sup>3</sup> Commonly known as the "Cinquième R.I.C."

<sup>4</sup> Commonly known as the "Neuvième D.I.C." and the "Troisième D.I.C.", respectively.



ministration of the Viet Minh party that was now declared an independent Republic.

24. Outside the key areas, the Viet Minh were in complete control in Southern F.I.C. The French Government had offered the Annamites the attainment of self-government by stages; but the latter had declared their intention of achieving immediate independence—if necessary, by force. On the 2nd September, before the arrival of S.E.A.C. forces, a serious riot had taken place, which had only been prevented from assuming grave proportions by the courageous action of released British and Australian prisoners of war, who were unarmed, and of the few R.A.P.W.I. Control officers who had already been flown in. On the 17th September, the day on which the independence of the Viet Nam republic was declared, the Viet Minh closed the markets in Saigon and a boycott of all French employers was enforced. Sporadic fighting took place in the town; but this was mainly unpolitical, and was engaged in by hooligans profiting from the prevailing atmosphere of unrest. The seriousness of the situation, however, lay in the fact that no legal writ ran; and that the Viet Minh party (who claimed to be in control) were taking no steps to see that order was maintained.

25. On the 21st September, Major-General Gracey posted a proclamation in all relevant languages, in Saigon and the adjoining port of Cholon, stating that it was his firm intention to ensure with strict impartiality that the transition from war to peace conditions should be carried out, throughout Southern F.I.C., with the minimum of dislocation to public services, legitimate business and trade; and with the least interference with the normal peaceful activities and vocations of the people. Calling on all citizens to co-operate to the fullest extent, the proclamation warned all wrong-doers (and especially looters and saboteurs of public and private property) that they would be summarily shot. No demonstrations or processions would be permitted; no public meetings would take place; no arms of any kind, including sticks, staves, bamboo spears, etc., would be carried—except by British and Allied troops and by such other military and police as had been specially authorised to do so.

26. While appreciating that the military situation in Saigon was grave, with only a small Allied force available and the river not yet open,<sup>1</sup> I felt that this proclamation—addressed, as it was, to the whole of

Southern F.I.C., and not merely to the key points—was contrary to the policy of His Majesty's Government; and since proclamations of this nature may well appear to be initiated by Government policy, I warned Major-General Gracey that he should take care to confine operations of British/Indian troops to those limited tasks which he had been set. At the same time, I approved the military measures which he proposed to take: these consisted in the first place of bringing home more strictly to Field Marshal Terauchi his personal responsibility for ensuring that the Japanese obeyed their orders; Major-General Gracey further proposed to employ Japanese troops for keeping the northern approaches to Saigon clear, moving British/Indian troops out to the approaches—and finally, he proposed to extend and consolidate his perimeter as soon as the remainder of 20 Indian Division arrived. (The categorical orders to Field Marshal Terauchi had the desired effect; and in the future the Japanese were to fulfil their obligations satisfactorily).

27. After consultation with General Slim and with General Leclerc (who, with his staff, was still at my Headquarters<sup>2</sup>), and in view of further reports from Major-General Gracey at Saigon, I telegraphed to the Chiefs of Staff on the 24th September that I considered that Major-General Gracey, in issuing his proclamation, had acted with courage and determination in an extremely difficult situation; with as yet inadequate forces. In my opinion, if the riots he feared had developed, the safety of the small British/Indian force and of the French population might have been compromised, since the river and port were not yet open. I informed the Chiefs of Staff that, as I saw it, two courses were now open:—

- (a) to implement the proclamation and to retain responsibility for civil and military administration throughout Southern F.I.C.;
- (b) to limit my responsibility solely to the control of the Japanese Supreme Headquarters.

28. I pointed out that the first course, which would include my directly controlling all French forces and Civil Affairs until such time as General Leclerc advised me that he could take over, would entail the potential employment of British and French troops throughout Southern F.I.C., to maintain order in support of the French Government. This course, which in practice would require a full British/Indian Division to implement it, was not in accordance with

<sup>1</sup> Minesweeping and surveying of the sea approaches, the anchorage at Cap St. Jacques, and the river to Saigon, had been completed, and sea communications opened, by the 28th September.

<sup>2</sup> I had asked General Leclerc not to go forward until Major-General Gracey was ready for him. He readily agreed, and volunteered to serve under his orders, on arrival, until such time as I turned over to him the command of any part of F.I.C.

my present instructions. The second course, by which the High Commissioner of the French Republic—or, in his absence, the senior Commander of the French forces, acting as his delegate—would have to be instructed by the French Government to exercise civil and military authority outside the key areas, would entail the re-affirmation by General Leclerc in the name of the French Republic of the proclamation already issued; since in my opinion it would be dangerous now to revoke it.

29. General Leclerc, however, while welcoming and supporting Major-General Gracey's proclamation (even though only one brigade of 20 Indian Division was as yet available for implementing it) was not prepared to re-affirm the proclamation in the name of the French Republic, until the 9th D.I.C. had arrived and he had ample forces at his disposal. I asked the Chiefs of Staff for a policy ruling, as to which of the two courses I had outlined was to be adopted: recommending, for my part, that the second course should be put into effect at the earliest date by which the French Government was prepared to take over. Any British forces which might subsequently remain in F.I.C., I suggested, should not be under French command, and should have the sole duty of maintaining control of Field Marshal Terauchi's Headquarters.

30. In the meantime, on the 23rd September, Major-General Gracey had agreed with the French that they should carry out a *coup d'état*; and with his permission, they seized control of the administration of Saigon and the French Government was installed. Considerable fighting took place in the city that night; but British/Indian troops had taken over the security of all important positions. On the 24th, the Annamites staged a determined assault on the power station, while unsuccessful attempts were also made to sabotage the radio and the water supply. On the 26th, Lieut.-Colonel P. Dewey, of the U.S. Office of Strategic Services,<sup>1</sup> was shot dead while motoring through the outskirts of Saigon, and his body removed by the Annamites. It was clear that the whole military position was deteriorating, and might well prove beyond the capacity of the only brigade of 20 Indian Division that had as yet arrived.

31. On the 28th September, when the situation in Saigon appeared very serious, I called a meeting with Major-General Gracey and Colonel Cédille<sup>2</sup> at Singapore, in the presence of the Secretary of State for

War:<sup>3</sup> at which I made it clear to Colonel Cédille that I considered it vitally important that negotiations between the French and the Annamites should start as soon as possible. I requested him to meet the Viet Minh representatives; and he informed me that, with Major-General Gracey's concurrence, he had for three days been trying to do so. At this meeting, the Secretary of State confirmed my impression that it was the policy of His Majesty's Government not to interfere in the internal affairs of French Indo-China.

32. On the 1st October, I received a telegram from the Chiefs of Staff, altering my instructions and informing me that I was to use British/Indian troops to give assistance to the French throughout the interior of Southern F.I.C., so long as this did not prejudice my primary responsibility for Saigon. I passed these instructions on to Major-General Gracey, while impressing on him that British/Indian troops were still to be used only in a preventive role and not in an offensive one. On the same day, Major-General Gracey and Mr. H. N. Brain (a member of my political staff whom I sent to F.I.C., until a permanent Political Adviser to Major-General Gracey arrived from England)<sup>4</sup> held a first meeting with representatives of the Viet Minh party, and stated British policy. The Viet Minh agreed to a cease-fire order, which the British undertook to ensure that the French carried out. Meetings between the French and the Annamites were held on the 3rd and the 6th October; but on this day the armistice was broken by the Annamites, who opened fire on British/Indian troops in Saigon. Two days later, 20 Indian Division H.Q. was established at Saigon and H.Q. Allied Land Forces, French Indo-China (A.L.F.F.I.C.); and in the next ten days the remainder of the Division arrived.

33. On the 9th October, Major-General Gracey, General Leclerc, and Colonel Cédille met me at Rangoon to discuss the situation; and I again urged the importance of further negotiation with the Annamites. During our meeting, news was received that the Annamites had again broken the armistice; and as it seemed clear that the Viet Minh spokesmen were incapable of ensuring that agreements into which they entered would be honoured, I ordered that strong action should be taken by the British/Indian forces to secure further key-points, and to widen and consolidate the perimeter of these areas. At the same time, I insisted that further attempts to negotiate must continue.

<sup>1</sup> See 'A', paragraph 40.

<sup>2</sup> French Civil Adviser to Major-General Gracey, and Governor-designate of Cochin-China.

<sup>3</sup> The Rt. Hon. J. J. Lawson, who was visiting the British troops in India and S.E.A.C.

<sup>4</sup> Mr. Brain was relieved a few weeks later by Mr. E. W. Meiklereid.

34. At this stage, difficulties began to arise in Cambodia; where a puppet Prime Minister, who had been put in power by the Japanese when they superseded the Vichy authorities in 1945, was still in control. The establishment of the Annamite régime in Cochinchina, Annam and Tonkin, had had repercussions in Cambodia; and early in September R.A.P.W.I. Control teams and small detachments of French and British Intelligence officers in Cambodia had already reported that a British commander and staff would be required in Phnom-Penh (the capital), to ensure that the Japanese troops there really complied with the surrender terms. Moreover, these officers had advised that French or British troops, or both, should be introduced: and accordingly, a small French detachment had been sent in, followed by a British commander with a small staff. The British commander (Lieut.-Colonel E. D. Murray) was appointed Commander of Allied forces in Cambodia; and was ordered to ensure that the Japanese behaved correctly. He was also ordered to arrange for their speedy concentration, prior to their removal to Cochinchina for disarming; and was to check all arms, ammunition, equipment, and stores in Cambodia, while assisting the local police and armed forces to maintain public order.

35. Shortly after his arrival. Lieut.-Colonel Murray had recommended that the Prime Minister should be arrested, if Cambodia was not to be embroiled in serious civil disturbances. It was vital that there should be no trouble there; for it was from Cambodia that supplies of fresh food were coming to Saigon and Cholon, since these were not obtainable in Cochinchina owing to the Annamite food blockade. On the 8th October, General Leclerc arrived in Saigon; and a few days later, at Major-General Gracey's request, he flew to Phnom-Penh, personally arrested the Prime Minister, and flew back with him to Saigon on the same day. This neatly planned and executed manoeuvre had been carried out without compromising the position of the King of Cambodia (who was antagonistic to his Prime Minister, but had not been able to interfere): his neutrality in the *coup d'état* had been preserved, for a day had been chosen when he was away on a pilgrimage. As a result of General Leclerc's prompt action, the situation in Cambodia was re-established; and the Japanese officers in the area began to co-operate in fulfilling their task of maintaining public order.

36. The arrival of General Leclerc in F.I.C. raised the question of when Vice-Admiral d'Argenlieu, the High Commissioner-designate, should go there. The

latter had visited me at Kandy in the first week of September, and I had asked him then not to go until General Leclerc had got to F.I.C. and reported that the time was propitious. This General Leclerc did shortly after his own arrival; and on the 30th October Vice-Admiral d'Argenlieu arrived at Saigon to take up his appointment of High Commissioner for French Indo-China, and nominal Commander of the French forces in the theatre—in this respect, under the operational command of Major-General Gracey.



While these difficulties were being dealt with in F.I.C., there had also been trouble in the Netherlands East Indies. Having taken over the N.E.I. from the South-West Pacific Area without any Intelligence reports, I had been given no hint of the political situation which had arisen in Java.<sup>1</sup> It was known, of course, that an Indonesian Independence Movement had been in existence before the war; and that it had been supported by prominent intellectuals, some of whom had suffered banishment for their participation in nationalist propaganda—but no information had been made available to me, as to the fate of this movement under the Japanese occupation. Dr. H. J. van Mook, Lieut.-Governor-General of the N.E.I., who had come to Kandy on the 1st September, had given me no reason to suppose that the reoccupation of Java would present any operational problem, beyond that of rounding-up the Japanese.

38. At a meeting with Dr. van Mook and the senior members of the S.E.A.C. Netherlands Staff Mission<sup>2</sup> on the 3rd September, preliminary questions concerning the reoccupation had been discussed—chiefly those of shipping and the organisation of Civil Affairs—but the Netherlands authorities had been unable to give me any indication of the state of affairs actually prevailing in the N.E.I. When I referred to a leaflet which had been prepared for dropping on Java, instructing the inhabitants to obey neither the Japanese nor the self-styled Indonesian Republic, Dr. van Mook informed me that this appeared to be a mis-translation; and I had accordingly telegraphed to Field Marshal Terauchi that I held him responsible, until the Allies could take over, for maintaining public order in Java.

39. In fact, a Republic of Indonesia had been proclaimed by Dr. Soekarno on the 17th August. By

<sup>1</sup> See Map 41 (between pages 283-284).

<sup>2</sup> See Annexure 12.



the time *H.M.S. Cumberland* had arrived at Tanjong Priok on the 15th September, bringing Mr. van der Plas (Dr. van Mook's representative) and a few Netherlands officials, as well as help for the A.P.W.I., the Indonesian leaders had had a month in which to organise. During this month, also, the majority of the tens of thousands of Japanese troops in Java (particularly in the eastern half) had handed over their arms to the Indonesians, and, on the orders of their own commanders, retired into self-imposed internment. The armed Indonesians fell broadly into three categories: first, and militarily the most effective, was the Tentara Repoebluk Indonesia (T.R.I.)—the "regular Army of the Republic", organised into a number of "divisions", armed with Japanese weapons, and to some extent uniformed. Second, came the People's Army (including Youth Movements) with varied assortments of modern and traditional arms; and third, a few terrorist secret societies (such as the Black Buffaloes): which were in some cases as well armed as the T.R.I.

40. Even if the political and military situation had been appreciated at the beginning, it would not have been physically possible (with our limited shipping lift, and the delay imposed by General MacArthur's order)<sup>1</sup> to bring in troops earlier than we had done, or in larger numbers. Or at least, this could only have been done at the expense of immediately establishing our own forward base at Singapore, and of establishing the staging-post at Bangkok which enabled us, in turn, to occupy Saigon and control the Japanese Supreme Headquarters. But as it was, the seriousness of the position was not suspected, and the picture only started to emerge as the Allied forces moved in to occupy key-points in Java, in order to carry out the tasks laid down by the Chiefs of Staff, which were:—

- (a) the reoccupation of key areas of occupied territories, so as to control the Japanese armed forces, and enforce their surrender and disarmament; and
- (b) the earliest possible Recovery of A.P.W.I.

41. On the 28th September, I held a meeting at Singapore with Lieut.-General Christison<sup>2</sup> and Mr. van der Plas, in the presence of the Secretary of State for War,<sup>3</sup> at which I pointed out to Mr. van der Plas the importance I attached, as a matter of military expediency, to his opening negotiations with the Indonesians as soon as possible. Next day, at my suggestion, he re-broadcast the Proclamation of December 1942 by the Queen of the Netherlands, which the

Indonesians had not received because of the Japanese occupation; Mr. van der Plas also made a reasonable and constructive broadcast, on his own account. On the day this broadcast was made, a battalion of Seaforth Highlanders, and 500 seamen and marines, landed at Batavia from *H.M.S. Cumberland* and *Sussex* and from Her Netherlands Majesty's ship *Tromp*.

42. The Secretary of State for War returned to Kandy with me; and, on the 30th September Captain J. P. H. Perks (Royal Netherlands Navy), of the S.E.A.C. Netherlands Staff section, expounded to the Secretary of State, to General Slim, and myself, the view of the Netherlands military commanders. This was, that the Indonesian forces were not organised, that the population of Java was a peaceable one, and that all resistance would collapse as soon as the Allied forces appeared in strength and showed a determination to put an end to unrest.

43. At this stage, the situation was confused by the misquotation of certain remarks by Lieut.-General Christison which had appeared in the Press, and had been broadcast in Dutch over the Singapore radio. This broadcast not only undermined Mr. van der Plas' attempts to fulfil my instructions to negotiate with the Indonesians; it also encouraged extremist opinion in Java, infuriated the Dutch, and led to the repudiation by the Netherlands Government of Mr. van der Plas' own helpful broadcast which had followed his reading of the Queen's proclamation. The Governor-General of the N.E.I.<sup>4</sup> had resigned his post, in protest against the proposal to grant concessions to the Indonesians; but at my earnest request Dr. van Mook, the Lieut.-Governor-General, agreed to meet the Indonesian leaders: his intention to do this, however, was publicly repudiated by the authorities at The Hague before any meeting could take place—and until his return to Holland, in December, the Netherlands Government continued to weaken Dr. van Mook's position as a negotiator.

44. I had been given to understand that the Netherlands authorities expected to resume the government of the N.E.I. as they had left it in 1942: and this was in accordance with the agreement between H.M. Government and the Netherlands Government. But if there was an intention on their part to introduce liberal reforms, in conformity with the Queen's proclamation of 1942, no intimation of this had been conveyed to the people of Java before the entry of S.E.A.C. forces. Mr. van der Plas, it is true, had held

<sup>1</sup> See 'B', paragraph 641.

<sup>2</sup> Who had come to take over command of Allied forces in the N.E.I. from Rear-Admiral Patterson.

<sup>3</sup> See paragraph 31 above.

<sup>4</sup> H. E. Mr. Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer, who had been a prisoner of war in occupied China.

out hopes of a more progressive attitude on the part of the Dutch; but his opinions had been at once repudiated officially—with an inevitable exacerbation of relations in Java. Of this, the Dutch A.P.W.I. on the spot, and the British/Indian forces protecting them, had to bear the brunt. In Holland, opinion was of course divided as to the wisdom and the ethics of the respective courses of action: but in the N.E.I., the attitude of the Dutch seldom showed understanding or adaptability. On the 6th October, I considered it necessary to send my Director of Intelligence, Major-General W. R. C. Penney, to London, accompanied by Lieut.-Colonel L. J. van der Post, a South African Officer in the British service who had been in Java throughout the occupation, to explain the true position to the Chiefs of Staff, Lieut.-Colonel van der Post then proceeded to Holland, where he was able to report to the Netherlands Government on the conditions in Java.

45. At a meeting at Singapore on the 10th October, I decided that, as the situation was rapidly deteriorating, over-riding priority should be given to the completion of the move of 23 Indian Division to Java. One brigade had arrived at Batavia on the 2nd, and the Divisional Headquarters was now in process of moving in. These forces, together with seven N.E.I. Army companies (and one ex-Prisoners of War battalion which had arrived at Batavia on the 4th, and an advanced R.A.F. Headquarters which had arrived on the 7th, were all under the command of Lieut.-General Christison at H.Q. Allied Forces, N.E.I. (A.F.N.E.I.), which had opened at Batavia on the 30th September, and was built round a nucleus drawn from 15 Corps Headquarters. By the third week in October, a second brigade of 23 Indian Division had been brought in; and also Main H.Q. R.A.F. N.E.I.—with two squadrons of the R.A.F. Regiment, two R.A.F. Thunderbolt (P-47) squadrons, and two Netherlands squadrons of Catalinas (PBY-5).

46. The seven N.E.I. Army companies were "Internal Security Companies", formed mostly of Christian Indonesians or Eurasians, and of a few Dutch who had been long resident in the Indies. Their discipline was not of a high order, and they were inclined to be excitable and light on the trigger—perhaps because many of them had families living in the interior, in areas controlled by the Indonesians. However it may have been, these troops created a number of incidents: which though in themselves of minor importance, had the cumulative effect of provoking the Indonesians—and this did nothing to ease

an already delicate situation. (In the following December, these Internal Security Companies were moved to an area outside the city limits, where they proved less of a hindrance to the fulfilment of our tasks). At Batavia there were many thousands of Dutch women and children who could only be reached from the port by seven miles of road running between a wide canal and a swamp; and it was vitally important that no situation should be brought about which would entail our having to make an opposed advance in this area. Moreover, since it now seemed that negotiations between the Netherlands authorities and the Indonesians might soon be under way, I directed, at Lieut.-General Christison's urgent request, that no more Dutch forces should be brought into Java until the situation was clearer and the risk of insurrection less acute.

47. My limitation to the key areas was the cause of disappointment and anxiety to the Netherlands authorities, who appeared to be unable to understand why I did not attempt to control the whole island; and my orders to concentrate the Netherlands brigade groups in Malaya, instead of sending them straight into Java on arrival, were also, understandably, unpopular. But these brigades arrived without any form of previous brigade training; and Lieut.-General Messervy<sup>1</sup> and his officers took great pains to help them with their brigade and special training. Senior Netherlands officers later generously admitted to me that this training in Malaya was shown to have been necessary; and that it would have been a mistake to send them into Java before they were ready.

48. By the last week in October, the British/Indian forces in the island consisted of one brigade of 23 Indian Division at Batavia; another at Bandoeng (with a detachment at Buitenzorg); one battalion at Semarang (together with an improvised brigade under command of the Divisional Artillery commander); and a brigade at Sourabaya, in the eastern half of the island. When this last brigade had arrived off Sourabaya on the 25th October, the Indonesian leaders refused to meet the commander outside the harbour, insisting that he and his officers should come ashore: for the Indonesians suspected that Dutch troops were about to be introduced, and the town handed over to them. They were informed, however, of the two tasks to which we were limited, and that we would help them to maintain public order in Sourabaya; and the port area was then occupied without opposition (while twelve Thunderbolts (P-47) flew overhead).

<sup>1</sup> Who succeeded Lieut.-General Dempsey in command of Fourteenth Army on the 8th December—on which date the

Army was reconstituted as Malaya Command.

49. Leaflets prepared by the S.E.A.C. Psychological Warfare Division<sup>1</sup> and authorised by Lieut.-General Christison had been dropped by the R.A.F. at various places in Western Java during October: ordering the Indonesians, among other injunctions, to hand over their arms, and stating that anyone found bearing arms 48 hours after the dropping of the leaflets was liable to be shot. The R.A.F. had worked to a programme which by the 27th of the month extended to the eastern half of the island: and on that day leaflets were dropped on Sourabaya. On the 28th, our forces put up road-blocks, and seized about 30 civilian-owned motor vehicles: many of these motor-cars were found to contain arms, which our troops confiscated. The anger of the Indonesians on having their mobility limited was aggravated by the removal by the troops of the Indonesian flag from some of the vehicles; moreover, the Indonesians complained that the confiscation of arms found in the cars was contrary to the terms of the leaflets, which had stipulated a 48-hour limit.

50. There had already been sporadic disturbances in the Sourabaya area, where the Indonesians were in possession of large quantities of arms handed over by the Japanese; and the situation began to look threatening. On the same day as we confiscated these arms, a convoy of lorries containing Dutch women and children was attacked by terrorist gangs: most of them were killed, and the remainder abducted. Fighting then broke out in the town. On the 29th, Dr. Soekarno (who had originally proclaimed the Indonesian Republic) arrived by air from Batavia, followed by Major-General D. C. Hawthorn, commanding 23 Indian Division; and together they succeeded in arranging a truce with the local Indonesian leaders. Later in the day, Brigadier Mallaby,<sup>2</sup> commanding the brigade of 23 Indian Division which was at Sourabaya, toured the city with the Indonesian leaders, who explained to the crowds the agreement made with Major-General Hawthorn. Extremists in the crowd shouted down the Indonesian leaders; and attacked the car containing Brigadier Mallaby, who was shot dead.

51. Fighting broke out in the town.<sup>3</sup> Mobs, armed with swords and spears, attacked Allied defence positions; and when they drew our fire, better-armed and trained elements (who had been sniping from the surrounding buildings) would emerge and attack. Outlying units of our forces were isolated; some were over-run, but others managed to make their way back to the dockyard area—where half the Brigade was

eventually concentrated, and a perimeter formed to hold the Indonesians. A number of A.P.W.I. were killed; and since thousands of these could not be brought within the perimeter in time, those of the Allied forces who were still outside rallied in the A.P.W.I. camp area at Dharmo, about a mile south of the town, to defend them.

52. On the following day, Lieut.-General Christison made an announcement—with the approval of my Chief Political Adviser, Mr. Denning, whom I had sent to Batavia—in which the Indonesians were warned that direct and unprovoked attacks on our forces would in no circumstances be permitted. They were further warned that if those who had committed such attacks did not surrender to the Allied forces, he intended to bring the whole weight of sea, land and air forces, and all the weapons of modern war against them until they were crushed. Lieut.-General Christison finally warned all Indonesians throughout Java that, if in this process innocent Indonesians should be killed or wounded, the sole responsibility would rest with those who had committed these crimes; and that Indonesians should therefore have nothing to do with the extremist element, but should co-operate with the Allied forces and live in peace and harmony with them.

53. On the 1st November, 5 Indian Division, commanded by Major-General E. C. Mansergh, arrived off Sourabaya; it landed in the dock area between the 2nd and the 9th—by which time one composite flight of 8 Thunderbolts (P-47) and 2 Mosquitos had also arrived. On the 9th November, after a week of negotiation (during which the A.P.W.I. and the troops from the Dharmo area had been brought into the perimeter) the armed Indonesians had not been persuaded to withdraw from the town; and an ultimatum, calling on them to do so, was drafted by Mr. Denning, issued by Lieut.-General Christison, and dropped on Sourabaya from the air. This ultimatum was ignored; and on the 10th, 5 Indian Division entered the town in the face of strong opposition from snipers, machine-guns, mortars, artillery and tanks, which the Indonesians had obtained from Japanese supplies. Our casualties were very heavy, and Major-General Mansergh called for naval and air support. Concentrations of naval and artillery fire were put down, and bombing attacks were made by Thunderbolts and Mosquitos of the composite flight, on Indonesian headquarters and strong-points.

54. By night-fall, our troops had occupied about one-third of the town, and had captured the city jail

<sup>1</sup> See Annexure '7'.

<sup>2</sup> Formerly Director of Military Operations, India Command. See 'A', paragraph 8.

<sup>3</sup> Between the 28th and 31st October, this brigade (49 Brigade of 23 Indian Division) lost 16 officers and 217 other ranks killed.

and released more than 3,500 Dutch and Eurasian prisoners. (A line was then established from which the advance was continued sector by sector, street by street, and even house by house; until, after three weeks of bitter fighting, the town was entirely cleared).

55. The operations at Sourabaya had been a special case, in which I had allowed use to be made of the composite flight: for the use of aircraft against Indonesian elements was only resorted to as an emergency measure, and to the minimum extent. I had delegated to force commanders the limited use of aircraft for attacking hostile targets, if this was found to be necessary for over-riding operational reasons, subject to the following conditions:—

- (a) the Indonesians were to be warned by leaflet that they were going to be attacked by air; in adequate time, before the attack took place, to enable them to clear the area and avoid loss of life;
- (b) the text of the leaflet which it was proposed to drop was to be telegraphed to my Headquarters for approval;
- (c) force commanders were to report, at once, each case of using aircraft offensively, together with their reasons for having done so; and
- (d) in order to ensure accuracy, practice runs were to be made by aircraft, so that the targets should be located before the attack took place.

56. Owing to the small number of our forces, we had been unable to protect the A.P.W.I. adequately in Ambarawa, Banjoe-Biroe, and Magelang, and had been forced to evacuate them from these areas to Semarang. This evacuation had been successfully accomplished only after heavy fighting to cover the movement by road (in every conceivable form of transport) of more than 11,000 A.P.W.I., of whom the majority were women and children. In Semarang, we were able to form a strong perimeter; and I approved the use of Japanese troops for this, since our own forces would have been insufficient to protect the lives of those collected there. Although the tasks we had originally gone into the N.E.I. to fulfil were those of disarming the Japanese and recovering the A.P.W.I., the fact that the political situation had made it difficult (if not impossible) for us to recover the A.P.W.I. with the forces at our disposal had constrained us to use the Japanese as well.

57. The hostility of the Indonesians was not directed against the British/Indian forces of occupation in the first place. Antagonism towards us had only arisen when it appeared to the Indonesians that by virtue of occupying the keypoints, so as to recover the A.P.W.I.

we were in fact holding these points as a means of eventually re-introducing the Netherlands administration into the country. And this impression had been confirmed when it became clear that the Japanese were not in fact being disarmed—though this was ostensibly our first task. For this, however, the Indonesians themselves were to blame; for, although their responsible leaders were only too anxious to negotiate with the Netherlands authorities, many of the rank-and-file of the Independence Movement had adopted terrorist tactics and tended to look on the women and children of the A.P.W.I. in the light of hostages.

58. Similarly, although in the first instance our troops were in no way involved in actions against the Indonesians, sporadic attacks on them by the latter had first led to a situation in which the British/Indian forces had to defend themselves and their charges; and then to a situation in which preventive steps had to be taken to forestall the Indonesian attacks. The clearing of Sourabaya had been an example of this. It is hard to draw a line between defence pure and simple, and those cases in which attack is the only effective form of defence: but it remains a fact, and should be made quite clear, that operations in the N.E.I. (which became progressively more offensive in character) were the direct result of a situation which was not intended in the first place, and which was in no way the result of His Majesty's Government's policy. This policy, as the Secretary of State for War stated it to Mr. Van der Plas (as well as to Colonel Cédille) at Singapore, was that H.M.G. would not interfere in the internal affairs of another country.

59. At the beginning of November, I was informed by the Chiefs of Staff that no Indian troops, other than those whose movement had already been planned, would be sent to Java. Public opinion in India was very strongly opposed to the use of Indian troops for the suppression of the Nationalist movement in Indonesia; the Government of India had made urgent request for their speedy withdrawal; and the Viceroy had indicated that he considered it would be necessary to begin withdrawing them in March. The Chiefs of Staff also informed me that 2 British Division, which was in Malaya, would not be available for replacing the Indian troops withdrawn. I conveyed this information to Colonel Froewein, one of Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands' staff officers, when he came to see me in Kandy in November; and he passed on this information to the Netherlands Government, transmitting also my opinion that an exceedingly difficult and critical situation might arise unless a political solution could be found.

60. One of the chief causes of friction in Java between the Dutch and the Indonesians was the Netherlands Indies Civil Affairs organisation (N.I.C.A.), planning unit which had been set up at H.Q. S.A.C.S.E.A. in July 1944, and whose personnel (under Major-General van Straaten) had arrived in Java in the initial stages of the reoccupation. Lieut.-General Christison had decided that the organisation must be demilitarised. Accordingly, at the end of October all N.I.C.A. personnel, excepting commanding officers, had reverted to civilian status; and the organisation had been re-named the Allied Military Administration, Civil Affairs Branch (A.M.A.C.A.B.). As a result of this, A.M.A.C.A.B. was more easily able to engage in welfare services, the distribution of supplies, and the custody and interrogation of prisoners.

61. The question of courts for the trial of Indonesian offenders was also one which presented great difficulties: for the military commanders were able to make arrests and to detain persons, but no machinery existed for trying them. Since the setting-up of British courts in a foreign country, even though Allied, was contrary to my policy, on the 16th November I authorised the establishment of Dutch military courts. The execution of all confirmed death sentences in criminal cases was to be carried out by the Netherlands authorities, and all proclamations issued in this connection were to be signed either by Admiral Helfrich, as Commander-in-Chief of the Netherlands forces in South-East Asia; or by Dr. van Mook, as Lieut.-Governor-General; and were not to be issued in my name. I retained, however, the right to review all death sentences imposed for political crimes.

62. Early in November there was a change among the members of the (unrecognised) Indonesian Government. Both Dr. Soekarno and Mr. Hatta had notoriously collaborated with the Japanese; and this was held against them by many Indonesians, as well as the Dutch. It therefore seemed good tactics to the Indonesian Leaders to put a non-collaborator in the foreground; and so the Working Committee of KNIP (the Republican Parliament) proposed the appointment of a Prime Minister in direct executive charge of the Government, without, however, displacing the President and the Vice-President from their offices. Dr. Soekarno approved this suggestion and, according to the best evidence, himself offered the appointment to Mr. Sjahrir. The hope obviously was that the Netherlands authorities could be expected to be more inclined to negotiate with Mr. Sjahrir than with Dr. Soekarno and his followers. Towards the end of November, Mr. Sjahrir told the Press that he

was prepared to resume tripartite talks, and had no desire to wait for this until the situation had improved. Unfortunately, on the day that his statement was published, the newspapers carried head-lines to the effect that Dr. Logemann, the Netherlands Minister for Overseas Territories, had (without consulting Dr. van Mook in Batavia) made a statement in Holland that made negotiations in Java impossible.

63. On the 3rd December, I reported to the Chiefs of Staff that the situation in Java had become more tense as a result of Dr. Logemann's statement: which had been interpreted as a virtual declaration of war. I informed them that I had been advised that, owing to the very large and increasing number (now estimated at 147,000, including some 90,000 Chinese) who were under our protection in Sourabaya, the question of evacuation from there had been greatly complicated. But I pointed out that if we evacuated areas in which a military administration had been set up, before a political settlement had been reached, it was likely that reprisals would be taken after our withdrawal against those inhabitants who had been friendly to us. I requested that His Majesty's Government should make clear what was my responsibility for these people; and I suggested that there were three courses open to me.

64. The courses I put forward were:—

- (a) the very early evacuation of Sourabaya and of Semarang (where the number was estimated at 19,000), so as to reinforce the troops at Batavia;
- (b) the reinforcement of Batavia from Siam by 7 Indian Division, by brigades. Coupled with this, the early evacuation of Semarang; and the total evacuation of Sourabaya at a considerably later date, when peaceful conditions had been restored as a result of political settlement—or else, if this failed, when replacement of British/Indian troops became practicable.
- (c) the imposition of law and order throughout Java by force of British/Indian troops (presumably assisted by the Dutch).

Each of these courses provided for the strengthening of the vital Batavia-Bandoeng-Buitenzorg area: but since the decision must be a mainly political one, I urgently requested instructions from the Chiefs of Staff as to which of them I was to follow.

65. Three days later, on the occasion of the passage through Singapore of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, who was visiting our forces in South-East Asia, I convened a conference with my Commanders-in-Chief and political advisers, to meet Dr.

van Mook, Admiral Helfrich, Lieut.-General van Oyen (Commander-in-Chief, Royal Netherlands Indies Army), and Count van Bylandt (Liaison Officer with the Netherlands Government at The Hague). After the meeting I sent a telegram, drawn up with the agreement of the C.I.G.S., to the Chiefs of Staff, informing them that after some discussion it had been unanimously agreed that Course (b) should be recommended. From the purely military point of view, I considered Course (a) the most desirable; but Course (b) was the one that would afford adequate protection to those inhabitants who were friendly to us, and who had consequently laid themselves open to possible reprisals.

66. In the course of the meeting, Dr. van Mook had asked that His Majesty's Government's recognition of the Netherlands Government in the N.E.I. should be made quite clear in the eyes of the world; the C.I.G.S. had replied that this point would have to be decided in London. Mr. Dening had reminded Dr. van Mook that the Indonesian leaders had been clearly told that the Netherlands Government was the only one which His Majesty's Government recognised in the N.E.I.; and that Mr. Sjahrir had been told that the Netherlands Government's offer to the Indonesians was considered an eminently reasonable one. Dr. van Mook, who had been about to leave for Holland, postponed his departure, hoping to obtain from the Indonesian leaders some concrete proposals which he could transmit to the Netherlands Government; but on the 11th, Mr. Sjahrir, who had admitted that he could not count on sufficient backing in the country to be able to put forward concrete proposals, made a statement to the Press to the effect that if the British tried to keep law and order by force of arms, or by planned military action, the Indonesians would resist to the best of their ability.

67. On the 13th December, our forces burned down the greater part of the village of Bekasi: where a terrorist gang, calling themselves the Black Buffaloes, had established their headquarters, and after evicting many of the peaceful inhabitants, were holding the village as a strongpoint from which to carry out atrocities in the area. On the 23rd November a Dakota (C-47) transport aircraft, with a British crew of five and eighteen Indian reinforcements bound for Semarang, had made a forced landing about five miles east of Batavia; and the occupants of the plane had been attacked by Black Buffaloes and taken to Bekasi,

where they were murdered. An operation against Bekasi was then ordered by Allied H.Q., as a retaliation for this, since it was hoped that the destruction of the dwellings of the murderers would have a salutary effect.

68. This intention became known and when our troops reached the village the withdrawal of the Black Buffaloes was well under way: a small rearguard, which stayed behind and fought, was rounded up. The mutilated bodies of the Dakota crew and passengers were then exhumed, and other bodies were recovered from the village canal. When these had been properly buried, our forces destroyed by fire the hutted portion of the village, which had been occupied by the terrorists. There were no casualties among the peaceful local inhabitants, or among our own troops.

69. I realised that although it was easy to criticise the act of burning the hutted portion of Bekasi village, the feelings of our troops, who suffered casualties every day at the hands of these terrorists and who on this occasion had had to bury the dismembered bodies of their comrades, must be appreciated. Nevertheless, I laid it down as my policy on the 17th December that, although all measures must be taken to ensure the security of our forces, and although reprisals would no doubt take place as a spontaneous result of understandable reactions to gross cases of brutality and murder, retaliation must not be taken in cold blood and as a matter of principle.<sup>1</sup> To this, I added the rider that, in the event of persistent sniping taking place from any building, or if buildings were being used to cover a road-block by fire (which had frequently happened during the evacuation of A.P.W.I.), such buildings might be destroyed after due warning had been given to the inhabitants, and after they had been given a chance of removing their effects.

70. In the meantime, I had telegraphed to the Chiefs of Staff on the 14th December that in my opinion the situation in Java could not be allowed to remain as it was. We had already had more than 1,000 casualties; and Lieut.-General Dempsey<sup>2</sup> had formed the opinion when he visited Batavia that unless a definite course of action was at once decided on, our position would deteriorate still further. I now suggested to the Chiefs of Staff that—quite apart from the longer-term courses (a), (b), and (c), concerning which I had asked them for a decision—there ap-

<sup>1</sup> On the 18th, the Chiefs of Staff telegraphed that questions were to be asked in the House of Commons; and on the same day the Viceroy telegraphed that there was much bitter and adverse comment in India. In both cases I was asked to report what had actually occurred.

<sup>2</sup> Who on the 8th December had succeeded General Slim as C-in-C., A.L.F.S.E.A., the latter having returned to England to take up the post of Commandant, Imperial Defence College.

peared to be only two immediate courses of action that would effectively deal with the short-term situation:

*COURSE X:* to convene at once a meeting between the Netherlands authorities and the Indonesian leaders, with a high-ranking British chairman: at which the Indonesians would be asked to give an immediate undertaking to cease from attacks on A.P.W.I. and on our troops;

*COURSE Y:* to round up the large numbers of known or suspected extremists, and retain them in temporary custody; to disarm and concentrate the Indonesian police force (many of whom were believed to take part in sniping at night); and to confiscate, as a temporary measure, transport at present in the hands of Indonesian extremists (and some of which was undoubtedly used for conveying Intelligence to the terrorist gangs).

71. Stressing my opinion that the situation would continue to deteriorate, I requested very early instructions from His Majesty's Government as to which of these two courses I was to pursue. In the opinion of Mr. Denning (which was confirmed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Bevin), Course X was premature: a meeting of this kind having already been convened under the chairmanship of Lieut.-General Christison, and having proved abortive. In the month or so which had elapsed since then, Mr. Sjahrir's position did not appear to have become firmly enough established for another meeting to be likely to give better results—particularly since the Indonesian leaders were themselves in danger in Batavia, and were reluctant to expose themselves within the Allied perimeter.

72. On the 21st December, I was instructed by the Chiefs of Staff to implement Course Y: which should have the effect of restoring public order in Batavia. I had requested that if Course Y was chosen, a statement should be made to Mr. Sjahrir; and I now received permission for this to be done. I accordingly instructed Lieut.-General Christison to explain to Mr. Sjahrir that, in spite of our restrained action, the situation had not improved; that terrorists were still intimidating peaceful citizens and preventing the flow of foodstuffs to the markets; that numerous acts of barbarism had been perpetrated against British/Indian forces; and that the Civil police force had proved itself to be thoroughly unreliable, and had often taken part in looting and even in kidnapping, in which the victims were sometimes killed with the utmost brutality. The Chiefs of Staff also authorised the

issue of a brief statement to the Press, so that there should be no misrepresentation.

73. With regard to timing, I was authorised to put Course Y into effect at once, if this was considered essential; but it was within my discretion to postpone it for a few days if I thought that the Indonesian leaders (who were temporarily absent from Batavia) should be allowed a reasonable time in which to return. I gave instructions that Course Y should be implemented on the 27th December. An infantry brigade which had just reached Sourabaya was moved to Batavia; and a brigade of 26 Indian Division was diverted to Batavia instead of joining its parent division in Sumatra, and was moved to Buitenzorg. The Batavia garrison was reinforced by 5 Parachute Brigade and, as soon as possible, by 50 Indian Tank Brigade Headquarters—both from Malaya. The firm clean-up of Batavia had a salutary effect. Intimidation of the local inhabitants largely ceased; and now that the town was no longer a place where a fusillade of shots might be heard at any hour of the day or night, streams of people began to return from the countryside.

74. The clean-up extended to Buitenzorg; and in a lesser degree, to the Bandoeng area, with similar results: in all three towns it was not long before the deserted streets had come to life again and shops and markets were re-opened. A contributory factor to this improved state of affairs was the removal outside the city limits of Batavia of the indisciplined N.E.I. troops, who had been a constant source of provocation. For there had been consistent counter-accusations by the Indonesians of shots fired at Indonesian leaders, and of general lawlessness. On the 2nd January, two further attempts were made by Dutch troops against the house of Mr. Sjahrir, which had already previously been attacked. These attempts were frustrated by our troops, and the assailants captured.

75. I sent a message to Admiral Helfrich, informing him that I had instructed Lieut.-General Christison to hold these men under British guard, and not to turn them over to the Netherlands authorities until he was satisfied that they would all be brought to trial by Netherlands courts for flagrant violation of the Netherlands Government's own policy of dealing with Mr. Sjahrir. I asked Admiral Helfrich what steps he proposed to take to disavow publicly the irresponsible actions of these elements, and I suggested that he might wish to issue an Order of the Day in his own name to the troops, making it quite clear that he would not tolerate any form of indiscipline or any disloyalty to the Netherlands Government's policy. This he subsequently did.



76. At the same time, it had been reported to me that N.E.I. troops under their own officers, on being moved outside Batavia, had burned down two large villages as a reprisal for alleged attacks by persons unknown. (The area, which had been searched by our troops the day before, had been declared free of armed Indonesians.) Heavy firing, including that of light machine-guns and grenades, had continued all night; and this clear case of reprisal was a direct contravention of the policy I had laid down—which had not only been issued by Lieut.-General Christison, but which I had publicly re-affirmed in my Order of the Day of the 1st January. I asked Admiral Helfrich what steps he had taken to ensure that there should be no repetition of such incidents.

77. When the Chiefs of Staff instructed me to put Course Y into effect, they had asked me to give them an estimate of when I considered the situation in the Batavia area would be suitable for the landing of Netherlands troops. I had replied that it was precisely on this question of the re-entry of Netherlands troops that the negotiations between the Dutch and the Indonesians might break down. When Course Y had been carried out with success, it seemed to me that the situation in Java as a whole was propitious to the opening of negotiations; and since I felt there could be no guarantee that this state of affairs would last, I urged that Dr. van Mook should return from Holland immediately, as accredited representative of the Netherlands Government, with full powers to negotiate. On his return, I would arrange for Mr. Denning and Lieut.-General Dempsey to meet him; and as soon as we were aware of the trend of discussions between the Dutch and the Indonesians, I would be in a position to make a firm recommendation with regard to the re-entry of Netherlands troops.

78. Lieut.-General Christison agreed with me that any weakening on our part about the re-entry of these troops to Java, Sumatra, Bali or Lombok would (in the present Indonesian frame of mind) impede the release of A.P.W.I. which Lieut.-General Christison had arranged with the Indonesians; as well as delaying the handing-over of the Japanese and their arms. The Dutch-Indonesian talks were the paramount consideration; and Lieut.-General Christison had renewed his request that I would not permit the re-entry of Netherlands troops until after these talks had taken place. In the meantime, Lieut.-General Christison was prepared to accept Netherlands Civil Affairs personnel; and our policy throughout had been to employ Dutch personnel to the greatest possible extent in all branches of Civil Service administration—in accordance with the Civil Affairs agreement between His

Majesty's Government and the Netherlands Government.

79. Since the end of October, when N.I.C.A. had been replaced by A.M.A.C.A.B., popular resentment had largely abated; and all normal departments of N.E.I. civil government were by now organised and working. Public utilities, which were being operated under Nationalist control when we arrived in the island, were still being operated by the Indonesians, who would not allow A.M.A.C.A.B. personnel to co-operate. We had all along been anxious to associate Dutch technicians with the running of these services, which were not functioning very efficiently under Indonesian direction; but until Course Y was put into effect, this would have been impossible without the use of force. At the present time, however, it had become a matter for negotiation between the Dutch and the Indonesians as part of the reorganisation arising out of Course Y.


80. Early in the year, negotiations were opened with the T.R.I. for the evacuation of large numbers of A.P.W.I. and Japanese in the interior. The T.R.I. agreed to evacuate all A.P.W.I. to Batavia; but no agreement could be reached on the question of the Japanese until all the A.P.W.I. had been brought out. After the first train-load of some 700 A.P.W.I. had reached Batavia, the Netherlands authorities protested that, since the evacuation was being conducted, and safe-conduct guaranteed, by senior T.R.I. officers, we were in effect recognising the Indonesian Republic: they therefore demanded that the evacuation should cease.

81. Ever since we had occupied the key-points in Java, my object had been to bring about a situation sufficiently stable to enable the Netherlands authorities and the Indonesians to come to some agreement. It was only if some kind of *modus vivendi* was established, that I would be able to complete the tasks which had been allotted to me, and which were my first concern. The longer it took me to round-up and disarm the Japanese, and recover the A.P.W.I., the longer I would have to maintain British/Indian forces in the N.E.I.; and I was not prepared to recommend the re-entry of Netherlands forces until I had satisfied myself that agreement of some kind had been reached between the Dutch and the Indonesians. Until this was accomplished, the only way in which the Japanese could be rounded up, or the A.P.W.I. recovered, was by enlisting the co-operation of the Indonesians.

82. For this reason, I considered that the implication, levelled at the evacuation arrangements made with the T.R.I., that the Republic of Indonesia was



being recognised because I chose to fulfil my allotted tasks by negotiation and not by force, was not a constructive contribution to the solution of the problems confronting us. The political aspect of the relations between the Netherlands Government and the N.E.I. was a matter for His Majesty's Government, whose policy had been clearly laid down; but the military aspect of the accomplishment of those tasks, which were the *raison d'être* for the presence of British/Indian troops in the N.E.I., was my responsibility and took first priority.



Outside Java, the state of affairs in South-East Asia gave no cause for anxiety. In French Indo-China the situation had cleared up by the end of the year: the 9th D.I.C. had arrived, and the 3rd D.I.C. was expected to arrive soon. I had taken Field Marshal Terauchi's personal surrender on the 30th November at Saigon; and had subsequently held discussions with Vice-Admiral d'Argenlieu, Major-General Gracey, General Leclerc, Rear-Admiral Auboyneau (Naval C.-in-C. Afloat), and Rear-Admiral Graziani (Naval C.-in-C. Ashore). On the 1st January, Vice-Admiral d'Argenlieu and I issued a joint statement, announcing that the French authorities assumed full responsibility for military commitments in F.I.C.; and on the 28th January, command of all French forces in the country passed from Major-General Gracey (who then left French Indo-China) to General Leclerc; while command of the British/Indian forces which remained passed to a reduced S.A.C.S.E.A. Inter-Service Mission established under Brigadier M. S. Q. Maunsell, late Chief of Staff of the S.A.C.S.E.A. Commission No. 1. The Commission itself ceased to exist.

84. By the beginning of February, the withdrawal of 20 Indian Division had been completed—with the exception of two battalions that remained to protect the reduced Inter-Service Mission, and to guard the Japanese at Cap<sup>4</sup> St. Jacques, near Saigon, where the Japanese had been directed to concentrate after the surrender. On the 1st March, I received the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff of my proposal that French Indo-China south of 16° should be excluded from S.E.A.C.; and this came into effect three days later. Thereafter, my responsibility to General of the Army MacArthur, so far as F.I.C. was concerned,

was limited to the repatriation of the Japanese—for which the Inter-Service Mission sufficed.

85. On the 13th March, I transferred Field Marshal, Terauchi, with a skeleton staff, to Singapore; and two days later I paid a farewell visit to Vice-Admiral d'Argenlieu, and concluded with him the arrangements for handing over to the French authorities the 68,000 Japanese personnel still in the country. By the end of the month, the remaining two battalions of British/Indian troops left for India; and the phase-out of the R.A.F. had been completed—only one small staging-post being left behind. On the 3rd April, I was informed that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had decided that the French Military Commander would take over my remaining duties as General of the Army MacArthur's agent in F.I.C.: in consequence of which I relinquished all responsibility at midnight on the 13th May.

86. In Siam,<sup>1</sup> there had at no time been any trouble. When Japan was defeated, the anomalous situation existed that whereas Great Britain was at war with Siam, the United States had elected to ignore Siam's declaration of war: I had therefore to determine whether, for the purposes of sending in forces, Siam was to be treated as friendly or hostile. Allied officers of Force 136 and O.S.S. had for a long time been in touch with Luang Pradit,<sup>2</sup> the Regent, who under the code-name of RUTH had secretly enrolled and controlled a large guerrilla force within the country. This force had been placed at my disposal, and before the end of the war arms and equipment had already been flown in for its use. The government which had declared war on the Allies had been overthrown, on Japan's defeat; and the Regent announced that its leaders would be tried as war criminals.

87. At the end of August, British and U.S. officers of the clandestine forces were waiting in Siam, while Siamese liaison officers were waiting at Kandy and at Calcutta: it was urgent that some understanding should be reached that would enable forces under my command to operate in Siam with the maximum of co-operation from the Siamese armed forces. Deciding that for military purposes the country should be regarded as friendly, I invited a Siamese Military Mission to visit my headquarters. This Military Mission, headed by Lieut.-General Sena Narong, had arrived at Kandy on the 1st September: where a military agreement was signed a week later. A further military agreement was referred by the Mission to the Siamese Government, who agreed to the signature of

<sup>1</sup> See Map 40 (between pages 283-284).

<sup>2</sup> After the war he dropped this title, and reverted to the use of his ordinary name: Nai Pridi Bhanomyong.

both; but at this juncture the Chiefs of Staff instructed me not to proceed with the second agreement, which had therefore remained in abeyance.

88. On the 3rd September, the staging-post had been established at Bangkok by means of which the A.P.W.I. from Siam and F.I.C. had been evacuated; and the establishment of H.Q. A.L.F.F.I.C. (which had been the means of securing early control of Field Marshal Terauchi's Headquarters at Saigon) and the S.A.C.S.E.A. Control Commission had been made possible by the use of this staging-post. On the 5th September, the King of Siam had returned from Switzerland, at the request of the Regent<sup>1</sup>; and on the 20th, Seni Pramoj (former Siamese Minister in Washington, and leader of the Free Siamese movement abroad) had been appointed Prime Minister. On the 24th, a Siamese delegation had arrived at Kandy, headed by Prince Viwatcha Chaityant, at the invitation of Mr. Dening—whom His Majesty's Government had appointed plenipotentiary for negotiating an agreement to terminate the state of war existing between Great Britain and Siam. The ensuing discussions made slow headway, owing to the need for constant reference back to Bangkok; and the agreement had not been signed by the time Mr. Dening was instructed to proceed to Batavia, on account of the political situation which had arisen in Java. Negotiations had been resumed on the 10th October; but the final exchange of letters covering the Heads of Agreement to terminate the state of war only took place on the 1st January, when the formal agreement itself was signed in Singapore.

89. I had already begun to phase-out British/Indian troops before this; and on the 14th January I was authorised by the Chiefs of Staff to begin handing over to the Siamese the responsibility for guarding Japanese surrendered personnel. On the 18th, I paid a four-day visit to Bangkok for the peace celebrations; and again visited Bangkok for two days in March. On both these visits I was given many proofs of the Siamese desire for the full resumption of friendly relations with the British, which their declaration of war had interrupted; and for the whole time that British/Indian troops were in Siam their tasks were lightened by the helpful and hospitable attitude of the Siamese people.

90. The Siamese Naval authorities re-fitted and repaired British ships at Bangkok, as soon as the minefield had been cleared and the port re-opened; while the dry-dock was put into operation by joint British and Siamese efforts. The British/Indian troops

in the country were provided with accommodation, food, and other services at the expense of the Siamese Government; while Don Muang airfield (near Bangkok) was placed with all its facilities at the disposal of the R.A.F., and the Siamese Air Force built and maintained runways, repaired living-quarters, guarded crashed aircraft, provided meteorological data, and carried out air-sea rescue. By the 31st May, all British/Indian forces had left Siam, with the exception of the Naval Officer-in-Charge at Bangkok, the R.A.F. Transport units, and two battalions: the repatriation of Japanese surrendered personnel and of the few remaining A.P.W.I. being my only remaining responsibility in Siam.

91. In Sumatra,<sup>2</sup> there had been hardly any trouble at all, during all this time. Sabang had originally been re-occupied on the 2nd September. On the 18th, at a meeting I held with General Slim, it had been agreed, with the concurrence of the Netherlands authorities, that the re-occupation of Java (which contained the administrative capital of the N.E.I.) should have priority over that of Sumatra. I had therefore directed that Padang, in Sumatra, should not be reoccupied until some six days later than Batavia; but that, simultaneously with the arrival at Padang of the initial elements of 26 Indian Division, from India, a token force of one battalion should re-occupy Medan. On the 10th October, H.Q. 26 Indian Division, with elements of a brigade, had landed at Emmahaven and proceeded to Padang and Fort de Kock; and on the 12th, the divisional artillery H.Q. with an infantry battalion and other divisional troops, had arrived at Medan. By the end of October, a battalion of the Burma Regiment had been landed at Palembang; while another brigade of 26 Indian Division had landed at Belawan with further divisional troops, which moved to Padang by road.

92. The security of the A.P.W.I. in Sumatra, and the degree of public order achieved, were due to the fact that the Japanese on the whole obeyed their orders and assisted materially both in protecting A.P.W.I. and in guarding arms and ammunition dumps outside our small, consolidated bridgeheads. This was not entirely true of the Japanese Air Division in the south-east of the island; but at any rate, considerably fewer arms became available to undesirable elements than was the case in Java. By December, the situation was so satisfactory that it was possible to divert to Java a brigade of 26 Indian Division intended for Sumatra; and the A.P.W.I., as well as valuable supplies and installations, continued to be guarded by the Japanese

<sup>1</sup> I had strongly pressed the Regent to recall the King quickly to ensure the stability of Siam.

<sup>2</sup> See Map 39 (between pages 283-284).

93. Although Sumatra, which had had an output before the war of some 120,000 tons of good quality coal a month, was now producing only 25,000 tons, this was of great value to us; since all over South-East Asia the pre-war productivity had been almost totally extinguished under the Japanese occupation: the pre-war output of 6,000 tons a month in Malaya, for example, having been reduced almost to nothing. A certain amount of difficulty had been experienced, when we first arrived, for the mines were controlled by Indonesians; but agreements had been made with them for working the mines near Palembang. In April, there was a recrudescence of local disturbances, and a certain amount of lawlessness: no doubt a reflection of the situation in Java; but I visited Sumatra at the end of the month, and it was made evident to me that the evacuation of Japanese surrendered personnel could be completed by the end of June, and that all the A.P.W.I. under our control could be extracted within the next three months. I therefore recommended to the Chiefs of Staff that British/Indian forces should be withdrawn from Sumatra as soon as both these tasks had been completed.



On the 15th August, in accordance with my new directive for civil affairs in Malaya from His Majesty's Government,<sup>1</sup> I had issued Proclamation No. 1<sup>2</sup> establishing a Military Administration throughout Malaya,<sup>3</sup> and delegating my judicial, legislative, executive and administrative powers and responsibilities to Lieut.-General Dempsey, as G.O.C. Military Forces, Malaya. On 1st October, Lieut.-General Dempsey had in turn delegated his powers to Major-General H. R. Hone, the Chief Civil Affairs Officer for Malaya. The Malayan Planning Unit had been established in London in 1943, under the War Office with Colonial Office co-operation. A representative had been posted to H.Q. S.A.C.S.E.A. in January 1944; and the whole unit established at H.Q. A.L.F.S.E.A. early in 1945; after which the field staffs had been mobilised with appropriate formations. The delegation of powers to C.C.A.O.(M.) marked the development of the Military Administration from its 'operational' phase, when its officers were all attached to formations which it was

their primary task to assist, into its 'post-operational' phase, in which they became detached from these formations and began to restore the framework of civil administration on a territorial basis. From that time onwards the task of the Military Administration was to rebuild the administrative machinery to a point where it could be handed back to Civil Government.

95. At the end of the war, the future constitution of Singapore and of the Federated Malay States was under consideration by His Majesty's Government. Sir Harold MacMichael had been sent out by the Colonial Office early in October, to lay before the various Sultans the tentative proposals which H.M.G. had instructed him to discuss with them. (By Christmas time agreements had been signed with the individual Sultans; and after Sir Harold MacMichael's return to London in January, His Majesty's Government issued a White Paper and introduced legislation in the House of Commons to give effect to their recommendations. When made public, this new Constitution met with considerable criticism in Malaya; and certain Sultans intimated that they had been over-persuaded into signing, though there was no reason to suppose that this was actually the case).

96. On the 25th November the S.E.A.C. group of headquarters had closed down in Ceylon and reopened at Singapore, which was geographically the centre from which I could best keep in close and constant touch with those territories to the north and east of Malaya for which I had become responsible. The C.-in-C. A.L.F.S.E.A. and the Allied Air C.-in-C. moved their H.Q. to Singapore; but the C.-in-C. East Indies Fleet was told by the Admiralty not to move his H.Q. from Ceylon, and was represented at H.Q. S.A.C.S.E.A. by my Deputy Chief of Staff<sup>4</sup> in his capacity of Senior Officer, East Indies Fleet) and by his planning staff. Admiral Power<sup>5</sup> also sent officers forward from his operational staff, to work alongside the Flag Officer, Malaya,<sup>6</sup> and the latter assumed operational and administrative responsibility, under the C.-in-C. East Indies Fleet, for the Forward Areas. On the 25th November, the withdrawal of U.S. forces from S.E.A.C. having been completed, American representation at H.Q. S.A.C.S.E.A. became purely a matter of liaison, carried out by a small staff under Brigadier-General T. S. Timberman.

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix I.

<sup>2</sup> See Appendix J.

<sup>3</sup> See Map 39 (between pages 283-284)

<sup>4</sup> Rear-Admiral C. E. Douglas-Pennant, who had been my Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff (Naval), had on the 28th August taken over as D.C.O.S. from Major-General Fuller when American participation in H.Q., S.A.C.S.E.A. ceased.

<sup>5</sup> On the 15th December Vice-Admiral C. Moody relieved Admiral Sir Arthur Power temporarily in command of the East Indies Fleet, until he was in turn succeeded by Vice-Admiral Sir Arthur Palliser on the 9th March.

<sup>6</sup> Rear-Admiral Sir Anthony Morse, who was given the combined title of Flag Officer, Malaya and Forward Areas (F.O.M.F.A.).

97. When we first returned to Malaya the population had received us with every sign of welcome. The Japanese had behaved with typical brutality; and the population had not only been disgusted at the treatment meted out to A.P.W.I., but had themselves been the victims of extended bullying and violence. There had been a widespread Resistance movement in Malaya, throughout the Japanese occupation, which dated from the defence of Singapore, when the Chinese fought to the last and had suffered from retaliation and atrocities as a result.<sup>1</sup> British residents who had managed to escape internment had in many cases joined up with the Resistance movement; and agents of Force 136 had maintained continuous contact with it.

98. The main Resistance organisation was the Anti-Japanese Union and Forces (A.J.U.F.) of which the nucleus was a party of 150 Chinese agents and guerrilla leaders who had begun the training and organisation of a Resistance movement throughout Malaya, shortly before the fall of Singapore. The movement had grown rapidly; and in February 1945, when the question of providing further arms and other material assistance to guerrillas had been raised,<sup>2</sup> the movement had already proved a considerable embarrassment to the Japanese. The officers of Force 136, responsible for introducing supplies into Malaya, had linked this question with that of the supply of arms and equipment to the A.F.O. in Burma: fearing that if the latter were suspended for internal security reasons (as Major-General Pearce had advocated), it might later be considered necessary to suspend supply to the A.J.U.F. in Malaya, since this was also a predominantly Left-Wing organisation. I had, however, obtained the approval of the Chiefs of Staff to continue the arming of the A.F.O. (and its military component, the B.D.A.) in Burma; and at the same time permission had been given for the arming of the A.J.U.F. to continue in Malaya.

99. When the build-up for ZIPPER was taking place, we had increased our efforts to supply the already considerable Resistance movement which the A.J.U.F. presented; who numbered more than 3,000, and enjoyed a very large measure of popular support. The provision of arms was hastened, and stores and equipment were cached in Siam; while the A.J.U.F. was being consistently supplied with ammunition and special equipment by supply-dropping Liberators

based on India. When we finally entered Malaya unopposed, no section of the community extended us a greater welcome than the Resistance movement, whose assistance in liberating Malaya had not after all proved necessary; and the outstanding leaders of the movement came to Singapore, where I received them at Government House after a public ceremony, attended by many thousands of people, at which I presented them with war medals.

100. The Resistance forces had given valuable help in maintaining public order, in the early days of the re-occupation. In the plan jointly drawn up by the Civil Affairs Staff and Force 136, and issued on the 20th August, Force 136 parties and Resistance Groups were directed to assist in the maintenance of law and order in any area of Malaya where this might be required; and the plan had aimed at ensuring control over all Resistance forces by giving them specific tasks, and by establishing a unified policy towards them, their use, and their final disbandment. The problem of demobilising the Resistance Forces in the Peninsula had been sympathetically but resolutely tackled; for they could not be allowed to become a permanent feature of the Administration, or to usurp the proper functions of the Police and the Courts. The terms of disbandment had been the subject of prolonged discussion, but finally parades had been held throughout the country,<sup>3</sup> on the 1st December, at which arms had been handed in, and clothing and money handed out; and the Military Administration had appointed an officer to help guerrillas to re-settle themselves in civil life, if they needed assistance.

101. In Malaya, it is the Chinese section of the population<sup>4</sup> which is not only the most enterprising commercially, but also the most politically active. The guerrillas had been predominantly recruited among the Chinese; and relations between the Chinese element and the Police Force (which was made up of Malays and Sikhs) were to remain uniformly bad. There is little doubt that, though the Japanese eventually managed to alienate most of the population, the Malays, as a community, had not in the first instance been completely hostile to the Japanese; and the Japanese had used the Police Force to suppress the Chinese resistance movement. As a result of this, Chinese antagonism towards the Police Force was now unrelenting; and relations between the Chinese and Malays gave cause for grave anxiety.

<sup>1</sup> The Governor of Singapore, shortly before the fall of Island had extended recognition to the Chinese parties—including the Kuomintang and the Communist Party of Malaya.

<sup>2</sup> See 'B', paragraph 489.

<sup>3</sup> In Northern Perak, however, an armed band defied the order and eventually had to be disbanded by force after it had mur-

dered two Malay officials and kidnapped a Brigade Intelligence Officer.

<sup>4</sup> The Chinese form 43%, the Malays 41% and the Indian community 13%—the Chinese being most densely concentrated in Singapore itself.

102. There had been racial trouble ever since the Japanese surrender; the first serious clash had occurred in Johore on the 21st August, when widespread attacks were made by Malays on Chinese guerrillas who were taking control of the area: it is estimated that 400 people were killed, many houses and settlements were completely destroyed, and when the Military Administration took over one of its first tasks in Johore was to deal with 14,000 refugees. Other attacks of this nature, with death-rolls of between 30 and 90, took place in various parts of the country between November and the beginning of March, when the Chinese were the aggressors in a surprise attack at dawn at Bekor, in which 76 Malays were massacred.

103. Every possible measure was taken by the Military Administration to prevent these occurrences; and to create friendly relations and a sense of common civic responsibility between the communities in the country. Moreover, it was the policy of His Majesty's Government, as set out in the White Paper issued after Sir Harold MacMichael's return to England, that a Malayan Union should emerge, with common citizenship, which would enable the inhabitants of the country, irrespective of race or creed, to enjoy the full rights of citizenship and to qualify for the public and administrative services. In the towns, and particularly in Singapore, communal feeling did not run as high as in the country areas. Here, the chief problem facing the Military Administration was to safeguard freedom of speech, the Press, and association, while preventing the abuse of these privileges by sections of the community who were prepared to hamper the work of rehabilitation in order to discredit the Administration.

104. The problems of administration with which we were faced on our return to Malaya had been aggravated by an acute lack of accommodation. Singapore, in particular, was already badly over-crowded: not only, as in other places, by a hiatus in the building programme during the war; but also because a very large number of A.P.W.I. and Displaced Persons from the N.E.I. had found refuge there, at the same time as the town's regular inhabitants were returning in ever-increasing numbers. It was in these circumstances that an Advanced Base had to be established in the town; and the arrival of the S.E.A.C. group of headquarters provided additional difficulties. As a result, it was found necessary to requisition a large number of houses, schools, godowns, and other accommodation—and this unavoidably created some ill-feeling.

105. There was a grave shortage of food. It had been taken into consideration, in forward planning, that a considerable proportion of the relief supplies allowed for under the Young Working Party programme (which for Malaya amounted to approximately 80,000 tons a month) would be held up by the great dearth of available shipping—but the seriousness of this dislocation had been accentuated by the suddenness of the Japanese collapse. Moreover, the Working Party's estimate of 34,000 tons of rice a month, as the bare minimum for preventing disease and unrest, was based on the assumption that 200,000 tons would be found in the country: and when only 50,000 tons were found, the monthly figure had to be increased to 44,450.

106. Rice, salt, sugar, flour and milk were stringently rationed; and all officers and other ranks, men and women, were forbidden to consume cooked food outside their quarters, except in Service clubs and canteens. Even so, considerable discontent was caused among the population by the disparity between service rations and the food available to the ordinary citizen. Owing to a general sense of insecurity, and a shortage of food and other consumer goods, there was considerable inflation; and in the last three months of 1945 the average prices of foodstuffs in Singapore were between 750% and 850% of pre-war levels—with other commodities magnified in proportion. Within a fortnight of the re-occupation of Singapore, a Price Control Proclamation was promulgated, covering fresh vegetables and fish: but it had to be withdrawn owing to the sheer impossibility, at that stage of enforcing it. A Food Control Inspectorate was gradually built up, however; and by the end of February (by which time the prices of rice, sugar, salt, flour, milk, meat, and cigarettes were controlled), it was so active in Singapore that congestion was being caused in the courts. Exemplary sentences were imposed, and given wide publicity; but offences continued, and the Black Market flourished.<sup>1</sup>

107. Strenuous efforts were made to increase local food production. The production of red palm oil was developed; the fishing industry was stimulated so far as shortage of nets and fishing-gear would allow; and when a scheme was introduced by the British Military Administration (B.M.A.) by which the B.M.A. was the only legal buyer of indigenously-grown paddy, an increasing amount of this soon became available. As in the case of Burma, however, a limiting factor in these schemes was the shortage of consumer goods

<sup>1</sup> Having heard stories of corruption in the case of other Military Administrations, I was on the alert for this. Special steps were taken by the Cs.-in-C. and the C.C.A.O. to check

corruption, and to detect and punish offenders; and quite a number of courts-martial with heavy sentences resulted.

(and particularly of textiles) with which to persuade growers to grow more than they required for their own use, and labourers to work in the factories and on the docks. Limited quantities of toilet requisites, electric torches, smoking material, cosmetics, patent medicines, sports goods, and bicycles, for example, began to arrive; but they were not, unfortunately, imported into the country until after the time when their presence would have been most valuable.

108. In the first three or four months after the re-occupation, there had been signs of growing unrest; and it is not surprising that the general high cost of living and shortage of foodstuffs and textiles together with the disruption of the economic and industrial life of the country which the Japanese occupation had brought about, should have given rise to a number of sporadic strikes which occurred throughout the Peninsula, and most particularly in Singapore itself. In some cases (for instance, a dock strike at Singapore) these strikes were based on definite demands for higher wages and improved conditions; but in others, the strikes appeared to be of a purely political nature, and called without reference to any specific grievances or demands.

109. In the second category, strikes were either declared as one-day strikes in the first instance; or else they were declared for an indefinite period, but called off after one or two days. Whereas, if there had been a definite objective, the instigators of these strikes could have hoped that their followers would hold out until the demands had been met, they presumably realised that strikes called without any specific aim cannot be maintained for more than a couple of days, without a loss of enthusiasm in the participants. Apart, therefore, from the registration of a general protest, or simply the embarrassment of the Military Administration, the most likely reason for these token strikes seemed to be that they were intended as a test of how far the General Labour Union would be able to count on popular support if it decided to stage something more definite. It became increasingly clear, however, that the strikes were unpopular with the majority of the population; and that they relied for their effectiveness on intensive propaganda and intimidation.

110. Whereas I regarded a strike with a genuine economic basis, where negotiation by agreement had failed, as a normal democratic procedure, I was not prepared to allow the port of Singapore (the base for troop movements and supply to the N.E.I., F.I.C., and Hong Kong, and for imports from Siam) to be dis-

located by strikes of a purely political nature. I therefore sanctioned the use of the armed services (in particular, technical tradesmen of the Royal Navy and the R.A.F.) and of Japanese prisoners for the purpose of breaking them; and I directed that intimidators, if arrested, charged, and convicted, should be awarded exemplary sentences. I would not, however, countenance the trial of Trade Union leaders on purely political grounds: although an Ordinance of November 1941 sanctioned persecutions of this nature.

111. In my Policy Directive for the British Military Administration of Malaya,<sup>1</sup> I had laid down as the first guiding principle to be observed, that no person should suffer on account of political opinions honestly held, whether now or in the past—even if these might have been anti-British—but only on account of previous offences against the criminal law, or actions repugnant to humanity. I had further laid down that I wished to be personally assured that no case occurred during the period of military administration in which the B.M.A. could possibly be accused of political victimisation. The following directions were to be observed:—

- (i) the circumstances of any prosecution (resulting in a sentence other than death) which might be regarded as having any political implications, were to be reported in writing immediately to H.Q. S.A.C.S.E.A.;
- (ii) before confirmation of a sentence of death in any such prosecution, a signal reporting the circumstances, with a suitable recommendation, was to be sent to H.Q. S.A.C.S.E.A.; and my comments were to be awaited before the sentence of death was confirmed;
- (iii) no proclamation was to be issued which had the effect of increasing the maximum sentence for an offence existing immediately before the Japanese occupation, without my prior approval.

112. Since 1941, the Registration of Societies Ordinance had provided that in Malaya a society was illegal unless it had been registered. But it was now the intention of the Colonial Office that this Ordinance should be amended to provide that a society should be legal until declared otherwise by the Governor in Council; and it had been announced immediately after the re-occupation that the Ordinance in its existing form would not be administered. Societies were consequently no longer required to register the location of their headquarters, the extent of their membership, or even the names and addresses of their

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix K.

principal officials. Of the many societies, therefore, which now came into being, it was not always clear which (and to what extent) purported to deal with labour questions as trade unions, and which of them were purely political. Many of these societies had, as the majority of their members, Chinese who had played a prominent part in the Resistance movement: for the A.J.U.F. itself had been largely directed by the Communist Party of Malaya (of mainly Chinese membership) which now controlled the General Labour Union.

113. From October onwards, strikes engineered by the General Labour Union had been of frequent occurrence; and on the 29th January matters came to a head when a General Strike of 24 hours was called, to demand the release of certain persons who were under arrest for various crimes including extortion and murder. The salient personality among these was a certain Soon Kwong, who had been charged with intimidation and extortion; but who, for lack of evidence, had not been convicted although he had had more than one re-trial. I had decided, at a meeting with Lieut.-General Messervy and Brigadier Newbould (Chief Civil Affairs Staff Officer, Malayan Union) at Kuala Lumpur, that in the circumstances Soon Kwong should be set at liberty: otherwise his continued retention would constitute preventive arrest, which was contrary to my policy. Orders to this effect had been given; but when it was brought to my attention that the threatened strike was coupled with a demand for his release, I promptly cancelled them. I considered that he should be set free; but I was not prepared to encourage lawlessness by allowing the instigators of direct action to suppose that their threat to paralyse the life of Singapore had in any way contributed to his release.

114. The strike took place on the 29th: it was estimated that 170,000 came out in Singapore alone; and in the Peninsula the extent of the strike bore witness to the efficiency and the ramifications of the directing organisation. A General Strike was again called for the 15th February. The day chosen was the anniversary of the fall of Singapore: the reason given, that the strike would commemorate the abandonment of the city to the Japanese. Whether the proposal was to celebrate the day as one of mourning and shame, or as one of rejoicing, the intention to discredit the British administration was clear. I refused to allow processions to take place on the 15th February: pointing out that there would be no objection to them being held at another date. At this point I was informed that the threatened strike was again to be

coupled with a demand for the release of Soon Kwong and the other persons in custody.

115. On the 9th February, measures for dealing with the threatened strike were discussed. I refused to agree to the preventive arrest of the organisers; but I was prepared to sanction the repatriation to China, under the Aliens Ordinance of 1933, of not more than 50 of the principal trouble-makers, if they could be proved to be of Chinese nationality and not to qualify (through statutory period of residence which His Majesty's Government proposed to apply in the Malayan Union) for Malayan citizenship. I directed that, in connection with this expulsion of persons of undesirable activities, cases of exceptional difficulty or doubt were to be referred either to myself or to my Chief of Staff. I also directed that a warning should be issued first, for I did not intend to use the Aliens Ordinance as a preventive measure, or retrospectively, but as a punishment for misdemeanours repeated after the warning was given. This warning, which was coupled with a direct reference to the manner in which it was apparently proposed to try and organise a strike in order to influence the course of justice, was issued in the afternoon of the 13th February.

116. It read as follows:—

“Since it was established in Malaya more than five months ago, the British Military Administration has not only allowed but encouraged full freedom of speech and of the Press, in line with the Civil Governments of the United Nations, who fought and won a war to preserve liberties of this kind.

“The Administration, however, has no intention of allowing advantage to be taken of this, nor that civil disturbances should be fomented, hatred of the Administration aroused, or the just processes of the law impeded in any way. The people of Malaya have given their full support to the Administration's policy of freedom of expression, and the Administration is assured of their support in the action it is proposed to take, to prevent recurrences of the recent abuse of this freedom.

“The British Military Administration wishes to give full warning that it will not tolerate pressure by any elements, either with a view to using the strike weapon in an attempt to interfere with the course of the law; or to endanger the peaceful living conditions of the population at large, by extortion, intimidation, or other illegal means.



"The Administration will use its full power to suppress actions of this kind, from whatever quarter they may come. Persons guilty of such conduct will be arrested and prosecuted and, if aliens, may be repatriated to the country of their birth or citizenship."

117. On the morning of the 15th February, a meeting was held in front of St. Joseph's Institution in Singapore. When requested to disperse the meeting (which was not at that time unruly) the speaker agreed to do so, and called on the crowd to re-assemble on the premises of the organisation. The crowd dispersed to proceed to the house indicated, falling into what the officer in charge considered to be quite plainly a procession. The speaker denied that the crowd were forming a procession; but the officer ordered the police to break it up: whereupon the crowd attacked the police with crowbars, sticks, and bottles. The police charged and opened fire, and two people were killed. In the Peninsula, demonstrations also took place; but the only serious incident occurred in Johore, where 15 people were killed when the police opened fire on a crowd that was attacking them. Neither in Singapore nor in the Peninsula, however, did the instigators succeed in bringing people out on strike in large numbers.

118. On the night of the 13th February, some hours after the warning had been issued by the B.M.A., ten Chinese nationals, implicated in the preparations that were being made for the proposed General Strike two days later, were arrested. Their names were subsequently submitted to me, with the recommendation that as they were prominent organisers and troublemakers, they should be repatriated to China. I did not consider, however, that they could reasonably be held to have had time to profit from the warning which had been issued; nor that they could since that warning have committed any misdemeanour which would qualify them for expulsion.

119. By a misunderstanding of the sanction I had given, that aliens of an undesirable type might be expelled, it had not been realised that I intended the fourth paragraph of my warning (which stated my policy clearly) should be the operative consideration. But I was not prepared to apply any punishment retrospectively; and I considered that if these people could not be charged with misdemeanours persisted in after they could reasonably be expected to be aware of my warning, their expulsion could only be on

account of previous behaviour (for which they had not been arrested and charged prior to the warning)—and this would be tantamount to expelling them, not for acts subsequently committed, but for the opinions that they were known to hold.

120. If I had had only my own Administration to consider, I should at once have ordered the release of these people from preventive detention. But I was determined not to undermine the authority and prestige of those members of the British Military Administration who, after the return of Civil Government, would remain as members of the civil administration. It was represented to me that the Colonial Office was anxious that these ten Chinese should be expelled from Malaya; and I was reminded that I was fully empowered, during the period of military expediency—whereas the returning Civil Government would not be able to detain them pending their expulsion, unless indeed one of its first acts were to legislate specially for this.

121. While categorically refusing to expel the Chinese (unless the Colonial Office would issue a statement that this had been done at their urgent request), I considered it my duty to the returning Civil Government to use my emergency powers to detain them until the Hand-over (which was to take place some six weeks ahead), so that the civil authorities on their return could apply or not apply the Aliens Ordinance, as they saw fit.<sup>1</sup> In theory, this compromise with my firmly-declared policy was distasteful to me; but I felt that, in practice, an exception could justifiably be made in this particular case—since persons whose avowed aim was the dislocation of my main operational base could hardly complain if steps were taken under emergency powers to restrain them from being successful.

122. In dealing with civil disorder in any form, I was determined to leave the returning civil authorities no legacy of ill-will; and neither to countenance, nor provoke, any situation which could prejudice the state in which they would find the country when they took over. One case in which I considered this object could be best achieved by drastic action was the problem of dealing with the sensational increase in armed robbery in Malaya since the re-occupation. There had been 90 cases of armed robbery in the first two weeks of January, for example, compared with three cases during the whole of the three years preceding the war. I would not agree to the introduction

<sup>1</sup> Singapore reverted to civil government on the 1st April, on which date the ten Chinese were expelled to their places of origin by the civil government.



of flogging; but since I was determined to provide the greatest possible protection to the general public, until such time as settled conditions had been re-established, I authorised the extension of the penalty for the illegal carrying of arms, to that of death.<sup>1</sup>

123. In Burma, I had revoked the Weapons Proclamation, which imposed the death penalty for illegal possession of arms without a permit: since I considered that it opened the door to political discrimination (in a country where a great number of guerrillas were still in possession of arms)—its logical conclusion, if taken to extremes, being that the supreme penalty could be imposed for failure to qualify for a permit. In Malaya, the situation was entirely different: the arms of guerrilla units, and of other *bona fide* possessors, had already been handed in; and under the unsettled conditions which obtained, anyone found actually carrying a firearm could fairly be presumed to be contemplating using it. I therefore issued a Proclamation, making it clear that the imposition of the death sentence was a temporary and exceptional measure, taken to deal with a special set of circumstances; and I coupled the issue of this proclamation with the repeal of certain articles of the Offences against the Forces Proclamation, which had also been issued as an exceptional measure, and which were now no longer applicable.

124. The Colonial Office and the War Office had agreed in November 1945, that the former would proceed with the creation of the necessary machinery for civil government; and that for purposes of planning the target date for the hand-over of Singapore Island and the Malayan Union should be provisionally fixed as the 1st March, 1946. It had been recommended to me, however, that, although it would be practicable to hand over the Malayan Union on that day, it would be easier to deal with problems of personnel, supplies, transport and departmental equipment in Singapore, if military administration were retained there until the end of March. As I considered it desirable that a single type of control should be maintained for all Malayan activities (especially the distribution of supplies) I felt that the two hand-overs should be synchronised. Another consideration was that, if more time were allowed for clearing the backlog of supplies, equipment, vehicles and personnel, it would make for smoother transition; and since the build up of Singapore base would only reach its peak in April, a month's delay would enable the Civil

Government to begin under more favourable conditions.

125. I had therefore recommended to the Chiefs of Staff that, both from the point of view of the military and of the civil authorities, the Hand-over could with advantage be postponed until the 1st April; and I had subsequently been informed that the Governors appointed for Singapore Island and the Malayan Union, respectively, would take over their responsibilities on that date. I was further informed that a Governor-General had been appointed for these territories, who would have no executive authority, but whose task it would be to co-ordinate matters which concerned the Governors in common. I had also subsequently been informed that a Special Commissioner for South-East Asia, with the main task of co-ordinating Commonwealth and Foreign Affairs in the area, had been appointed.<sup>2</sup>

126. A Hand-over Committee for Malaya had been set up under the chairmanship of my Director of Civil Affairs (Brigadier E. J. Gibbons), on which H.Q. S.A.C.S.E.A., H.Q. A.L.F.S.E.A., and the B.M.A., were represented. Its functions were:—

- (a) to recommend to me the principles upon which the action to effect the hand-over should be based;
- (b) to ascertain and report to me from time to time the progress achieved in preparation for the restoration of civil government: especially in such matters as organisation, accommodation, personnel and supplies;
- (c) to ensure effective co-ordination by the military and civil authorities in preparation for the Hand-over.

127. By the Middle of March, when the final preparations were under way, the general condition of the country was greatly improving. The incidence of armed robberies was already greatly decreasing; inter-racial clashes in the country areas were becoming less frequent; and in Singapore there had been no labour troubles since the flare-up on the 15th February. The Indian community (which, although it forms about one-eighth of the population, had before the war provided more than half the unskilled labour) was about to receive the visit of Pandit Nehru, whom at the Viceroy's request I had invited to visit Malaya as an official representative of the All-India Congress. The younger generation of Indians in Malaya was

<sup>1</sup> During the period of military administration two persons were to be sentenced to death and executed under this increased penalty.

<sup>2</sup> Both these appointments were created at my suggestion.

politically active, mainly in Singapore; and their organisations, such as the Indian Independence League and the Indian Democratic League, were affiliated with the Communist Party of Malaya. But these organisations were quiescent, and there had been an almost entire lack of demonstrations on the 21st January (which was I.N.A. Day) and on the 23rd January (which was the birthday of Subhas Chandra Bose).

128. On the 18th March, Pandit Nehru arrived in Singapore, where I received him at Government House and drove him in my car to the Indian Troops Welfare Centre. He dined with me that night; and I informed him that, since many of them possessed no other clothes, I had authorised ex-members of the I.N.A. to wear I.N.A. uniform, provided that no military badges of rank were worn. As I knew that Indians, both troops and civilians, from the outlying districts of Singapore Island would wish to congregate and receive him, I had placed the trucks of the B.M.A. at their disposal, to bring them into the centre for the day and return them to their districts. Pandit Nehru's visit, which he had told the Viceroy that he wished to make so as to investigate at first hand the conditions of the Indian community in Malaya, lasted nine days. During this time he addressed many meetings, in Singapore and in all parts of the Peninsula, at which he urged that the Indians should stand together; and as a representative Indian he was received with great enthusiasm, unmarred by communal dissension of any kind.

129. H.E. the Special Commissioner for South-East Asia, Lord Killearn, arrived at Singapore on the 16th March. Although his main responsibility was to be co-ordination of Commonwealth and Foreign Affairs, His Majesty's Government had sent Lord Killearn out urgently, to deal with the grave food situation which had been developing in the area, as a result of the world food shortage. He set about his task immediately on arrival: holding a preliminary Food Conference from the 26th to the 28th March,<sup>1</sup> which was attended by representatives of every country in South-East Asia. Among Lord Killearn's problems<sup>2</sup> was the fact that neither Burma nor Siam was providing rice in the required amounts; and in Siam he inherited the responsibility for extremely protracted negotiations on this subject with the Siamese Government. On the

10th April, he took over my responsibility for the co-ordination of imports and exports of freight. Pending the arrival of his own full staff, the help of my P.A.O.<sup>3</sup> was available to him, and some officers were temporarily attached from H.Q. S.A.C.S.E.A.; but he had to rely on H.Q. S.A.C.S.E.A. and H.Q. A.L.F.S.E.A. in dealing with transportation questions.

130. Rice shipment was organised by H.Q. S.A.C.S.E.A. and H.Q. A.L.F.S.E.A., as part of the S.E.A.C. freight movement programme; and arrangements had also been made to obtain about 60,000 tons of flour. But with the sharp deterioration of the global flour position, flour soon became as difficult to obtain as rice. Moreover, Allied shipping was still strained to the utmost, owing to the need of simultaneously covering places so far apart; while dock strikes and the reduced efficiency of dock labour,<sup>4</sup> due chiefly to malnutrition, had aggravated the inevitable delay of supplies. For the first few months of the re-occupation, relief supplies had been arriving rather behind the planned programme of delivery; but although by the end of February the majority of backlogs had been made up, imports of cereal never came up to schedule.<sup>5</sup> This, combined with our growing difficulty in obtaining flour, had now led to a situation in which we were faced with a prospective deficit of some 50% in our cereal requirements for the second quarter of 1946.

131. On the 1st April, Singapore and the Malayan Union were restored to civil government. The hand-over was accomplished with the minimum of administrative dislocation: the Hand-over Committee reporting, after it had been in operation for one month and had held seven meetings, that no further meetings would be necessary as there were no further problems to be dealt with. At a formal ceremony at Kuala Lumpur on the 1st, Lieut.-General Messervy, G.O.C.-in-C. Malaya, read a Proclamation terminating Military Administration in the Singapore and Malay Peninsula Divisions, with effect in both divisions from the time when the Governor of Singapore and the Governor of the Malayan Union respectively assumed offices. (This Proclamation had been signed by me on the 18th March, before I left on a three weeks' visit to Australia and New Zealand, at the invitation of their respective governments). Sir Edward Gent was then

<sup>1</sup> I was at this time in Australia. (See paragraph 131 below).

<sup>2</sup> In April, the Indonesian authorities offered the Government of India 700,000 tons of rice in exchange for textiles and manufactured goods; and Lord Killearn was criticised by the Netherlands authorities for allowing these negotiations to be carried on.

<sup>3</sup> Major-General R. F. S. Denning, who had succeeded Lieut.-General R. A. Wheeler, U.S. Army on the 23rd September 1945.

<sup>4</sup> Nevertheless, the port capacity of Rangoon had been increased from virtually nil to some 4,000 tons a day by February; while by May, the daily overall capacity of Singapore had reached an average of 7,000 tons.

<sup>5</sup> Starting from 'scratch', however, 123,000 tons of rice had been exported from Burma, 94,000 from Siam, and 7,000 from F.I.C., by February—a total of 224,000.

duly sworn in as Governor and Commander-in-Chief of the Malayan Union.

132. At Singapore, a ceremony was held simultaneously with the one at Kuala Lumpur, and Military Administration was terminated in the Singapore Division. The Proclamation was read by the Acting Supreme Allied Commander, Air Chief Marshal Park,<sup>1</sup> and in the absence of the Governor-designate, whose arrival by air had been delayed. Mr. P. A. B. MacKerron<sup>2</sup> was installed and sworn in as Officer Administering the Government of the Colony of Singapore. (In view of the wording of the proclamation I had signed, it was necessary to issue an amending proclamation to cover the situation created by the assumption of office by an Officer Administering the Government, in place of the Governor himself; and both proclamations were read at the ceremony). On the 3rd April, Mr. F. C. (later Sir Franklin) Gimson, who had spent two days in one of H.M. ships in the harbour (having arrived some hours after the original ceremony), was formally installed Governor and Commander-in-Chief of the Colony of Singapore.

133. On the 1st April, India had ceased to be the base for South-East Asia Command,<sup>3</sup> and this had caused a certain dislocation in administrative arrangements, owing to the need to build up stocks of essential commodities at Singapore, so that there should be no hiatus until the supplies provided under War Office arrangements came forward. The Colonial Governors now assumed responsibility for the maintenance of public order, the rehabilitation and working of port and movement facilities, for accommodation, and for supply. Lord Killearn held his Main Food Conference from the 15th to the 17th April, after my return from Australia: this was attended by T. E. the Governors of Burma, Ceylon, the Malayan Union and Singapore; H.E. the C.-in-C. Hong Kong, and representatives of India and Australia (who attended as observers); British delegates from all other countries in the Command; and myself. On the 21st May, H.E. the Governor-General, the Rt. Hon. Malcolm Macdonald, arrived at Singapore. Although he and Lord Killearn were jointly to constitute the South-East Asia Defence Committee, they both made it clear that they wished the S.A.C.S.E.A. organisation to continue; and they themselves attended the Supreme Allied Commander's meetings. The responsibilities which now remained to me were the control and allocation of radio frequen-

cies within the Command; the repatriation of Japanese surrendered personnel and civilians, as well as the trial of War Criminals; and overall responsibility for British North Borneo, Brunei, Labuan, and the Netherlands East Indies.



134. In Java, things had taken a turn for the better at the end of January, when Dr. van Mook had returned from Holland with the authorisation of the Netherlands Government to put up proposals to the Indonesian leaders. On the 1st February, Lord Inverchapel arrived at Batavia (from Moscow, where as Sir Archibald Clerk-Kerr he had been British Ambassador), having been appointed by His Majesty's Government to advise on political issues in the N.E.I., and to offer his good services to the Netherlands authorities and the Indonesians in helping to find a solution of their problem.<sup>4</sup> Shortly after his arrival, Lord Inverchapel held a meeting with Dr. van Mook and Mr. Sjahrir, at which Dr. van Mook made public the proposals of the Netherlands Government; and in the next few weeks Lord Inverchapel managed to win the confidence of both sides and to convince the Dutch and the Indonesians that both their long-term interests would be served by coming to a reasonable accommodation. At Dr. van Mook's suggestion, Lord Inverchapel recommended that Netherlands troops should be introduced into Java early in March; and I passed this recommendation on to the Chiefs of Staff, who approved it.

135. The re-introduction began, by sea, on the 8th March, and by the first week in April the move of Netherlands forces from Malaya to Java had been completed. Three brigade groups, with a squadron of Mitchells (B.25) and a squadron of Kittyhawks, went to Batavia; the Netherlands Marine Brigade and a Netherlands brigade group were at Sourabaya; and at Semarang there was one brigade group, less one battalion on Bangka Island. The quality of these Netherlands troops was far superior to that of the forces which had originally landed in Java. The Marine Brigade had been equipped and trained in the United States; and the men of the brigade groups had been trained in Malaya, after seeing service in the underground movement against the Germans in Holland. Unfortunately, however, some of the local

<sup>1</sup> Sir Keith Park was succeeded as Allied Air C.-in-C. on the 23rd April by Air Marshal Sir George Pirie.

<sup>2</sup> Who, as Brigadier MacKerron, had throughout the Military Administration been Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer, Singa-

pore Division; and who, with effect from the 1st April, had been appointed Colonial Secretary, Singapore.

<sup>3</sup> On the 15th April I consequently closed down my Rear Headquarters in New Delhi.

<sup>4</sup> This appointment was created at my suggestion.

Netherlands authorities in Java were dissatisfied with Allied military policy, and appeared to feel that it was impeding their intention of clearing the N.E.I. by force; and it may have been this fact which was responsible for some unfortunate incidents.

136. Shortly after their arrival, elements of a Netherlands brigade group stationed in Batavia captured the village of Pesing, about four miles outside the town, after considerable fighting. This attack had been planned, and the operation ordered, by the Netherlands commander without any reference to the Allied Commander in Batavia (Brigadier G. P. L. Weston); and was in contravention of the operation order forbidding offensive action except upon the orders of the Allied Commander, and requiring prior sanction for any action of this nature considered necessary for the security of an area. The original report from the Netherlands commander, which did not disclose the fact that fighting had occurred, had indicated that the occupation of Pesing had been the result of a normal patrol, and that the village had been found to be unoccupied.

137. In spite of other incidents of this kind on the military side, steady progress was being made towards an accommodation between the Netherlands authorities and the Indonesian leaders. On the 4th April, Lord Inverchapel, Dr. van Mook, and Indonesian delegates flew to Holland to continue negotiations; and at the end of April, by agreement with the Indonesians, the evacuation by rail of A.P.W.I. and Japanese from the interior of Java began. But this move was found to be impracticable, owing to shortage of engines and rolling-stock; after consultation with the Indonesians, evacuation by air was decided on, and began on the 20th May.

138. Lieut.-General Christison, who had served eight years abroad, had been appointed G.O.C.-in-C. Northern Command in the United Kingdom, in the first week in February; and on leaving for England had been relieved by Lieut.-General Stopford.<sup>1</sup> On his departure, Lieut.-General Christison received a public tribute, both from Dr. van Mook and from Mr. Sjahrir, who recognised the impartiality and fair-mindedness with which he had consistently behaved in what had at times been a very difficult situation. On the 23rd April, Lieut.-General Stopford, in his turn, was relieved (having been appointed C.-in-C. A.L.F. S.E.A. in succession to Lieut.-General Dempsey),<sup>2</sup> and

Major-General Mansergh, commanding 5 Indian Division at Sourabaya, took over the command of A.F.N.E.I.

139. On the 25th April, I visited Java and Sumatra; and on arriving at Batavia, called on the acting Lieut.-Governor-General, Dr. Blum; and after luncheon with the new Netherlands Commander-in-Chief, Lieut.-General Spoor,<sup>3</sup> I held an informal meeting with Mr. Sjahrir. I then held a meeting with the commanders of Allied forces in N.E.I., and H.M. Consul-General in Batavia, Mr. G. MacKereth, which was attended by Lord Killearn. On my return to Singapore I held a further meeting, with my Cs.-in-C., as a result of which I proposed to the Chiefs of Staff that the whole of the Netherlands East Indies, with the exception of the key-points that we were occupying in Java and Sumatra, should be transferred from S.E.A.C.; and that the Netherlands authorities should assume responsibility as from the 1st July for the maintenance of law and order. I further recommended that our forces should be withdrawn by the end of July, when the Netherlands authorities would resume entire responsibility.<sup>4</sup>

140. It was evident by this time that the evacuation of Japanese surrendered personnel could be completed by the end of June, and that all A.P.W.I. under our control could be extracted within the next three months. If we were to remain, in order to guard the coal and oil installations in Sumatra, additional forces would be required from outside S.E.A.C., besides the retention of several thousand Japanese under arms. I suggested, however, that if my proposal proved unacceptable for political reasons, the Japanese should be evacuated, and that the garrison should be withdrawn from Padang to reinforce Medan and Palembang. Bangka Island had been reoccupied by Netherlands forces on the 11th February, in the face of minor opposition from the Indonesians; Bali had been reoccupied, also by Netherlands forces (under the command of 5 Indian Division) on the 2nd March; and Lombok on the 27th March. There had been no opposition to either of these landings; though there had been subsequent minor disturbances in the interior of Bali, which had been dealt with by the Dutch.

141. The Outer Islands of the N.E.I. (which included Netherlands New Guinea and the whole of the Archipelago excepting Java and Sumatra<sup>5</sup>) had been

<sup>1</sup> Who was relieved as G.O.C. Burma by Lieut.-General H. R. Briggs.

<sup>2</sup> Who was appointed C.-in-C. Middle East.

<sup>3</sup> Admiral Helfrich had come to Singapore on the 11th February, to say goodbye to me on being relieved by Lieut.-

General Spoor (who had relieved Lieut.-General von Oyen earlier as C.-in-C. Netherlands East Indies Army).

<sup>4</sup> See paragraph 153 below.

<sup>5</sup> See Map 42 (between pages 283-284).

partially occupied in August 1945 by the Australian forces; and it had been found impossible to relieve them of this responsibility until January 1946, when a brigade of 20 Indian Division could be transferred from F.I.C., and an R.A.F. staging-post set up at Macassar. A number of Netherlands Internal Security Companies had been made available from Australia at about this time; and I had been able to deploy them throughout the islands, to eke out the British/Indian troops. (When I left the Command, on the 31st May, there were 36 native companies and 6 Netherlands companies in the Outer Islands, as well as six battalions formed from ex-prisoners of war).

142. The Australian forces had also reoccupied British Borneo,<sup>1</sup> which had been surrendered to them by the Japanese when they were fighting there in August 1945; and General of the Army MacArthur had thereupon formally transferred the area to General Blamey, Commander-in-Chief, Australian Imperial Forces. A Military Administration had been set up by Lieut.-General Sir Leslie Morehead, G.O.C. Australian Military Forces in British Borneo, with Brigadier C. G. P. Macaskie as C.C.A.O. In December I had visited the Australian forces in British Borneo (as well as in Celebes and Dutch Borneo), and had found everything satisfactory from the occupational point of view. On the 5th January, I had taken over control of British Borneo from General Blamey; and on the 8th, I had issued a further proclamation, delegating my powers to the Officer Commanding military forces in the territory.<sup>2</sup> The Australian forces were relieved by a brigade of 20 Indian Division, from F.I.C., and R.A.F. elements also moved in.

143. On the 10th January, I had been instructed that His Majesty's Government had decided that Civil Administration should be restored in British Borneo, and responsibility assumed by the Colonial Office, as soon as possible—the 1st March being set as the target date—and a Hand-over Committee was set up to provide smooth transition from military to civil government. Of the four territories in question, British North Borneo had before the war been administered by a Chartered Company, Brunei and Labuan by the Colonial Office, and Sarawak by Rajah Sir Charles Vyner Brooke. Sarawak reverted to the Rajah on the 15th April; but constitutional problems occasioned by negotiations between His Majesty's Government and the British North Borneo Company, for the acquisition by H.M.G. of direct administrative responsibility for North Borneo, postponed the hand-over date—and when I left the Command on the 31st

May, Brunei, Labuan, and North Borneo were still under military administration.

144. With the gradual handing-over of responsibilities, the plan (EPILOGUE) for the progressive reduction of the South-East Asia garrison to its post-war strength had been going well ahead. The operation had been planned in two phases: first, the British/Indian formations were to be reduced from 360,000 to 130,000 between the 1st February and the 1st October; second, they were further to be reduced to 70,000 by the 1st January 1947. At the same time, the repatriation to the United Kingdom of the British forces continued under PYTHON: the tour overseas for both military and R.A.F. personnel being now three years. It was only natural that dissatisfaction should at times have risen over isolated factors: such alleged inequalities in the speed of release between corresponding groups in the respective services, or between different trades within the same group. But the rate of release (which had been accelerated when Japan surrendered) had been maintained; and by March 1946, the releases had totalled 1,200 Naval officers and 11,600 ratings and Marine other ranks; 3,746 Army officers and 35,837 other ranks; and 3,886 R.A.F. officers and 27,682 airmen, making a total of 83,951

145. The large-scale movement to the United Kingdom which this release had entailed, and the essential priority accorded to it, had greatly strained the shipping position in the theatre, even though special shipping had been allocated for it by the Director of Sea Transport. And this had been aggravated by the simultaneous release scheme for Indian personnel: which had originally been modelled on the British scheme, with release by age and service group priority, but which had been greatly accelerated when it was decided to reduce as quickly as possible to the establishment fixed for the post-war Indian Army. Nevertheless, except for occasional short delays, caused by last-minute alterations to the shipping programme, the position had been satisfactory.

146. Shortage of shipping had greatly delayed the repatriation of the Japanese. Allied ships in S.E.A.C. were not used for this: and in the first instance whatever serviceable Japanese ocean-going ships were available had been used—but as the total of this shipping could only carry 14,000 in one lift, it would have taken until the end of 1950 for all the Japanese from the Command to be repatriated. On the 10th December, General of the Army MacArthur had promised to reinforce our Japanese shipping lift with

<sup>1</sup> See Map 41 (between pages 283-284).

<sup>2</sup> Major-General E. J. Milford, who had by then relieved Lieut.-General Morehead.

craft to carry an additional 9,000; and these vessels had arrived towards the end of February—even so, it would still take until the first quarter of 1949 to clear S.E.A.C. I had therefore again appealed to the Chiefs of Staff, pointing out the military, economic and probable political repercussions of the retention of such large numbers of Japanese surrendered personnel in the theatre for such a long time. But General of the Army MacArthur had intimated that shipping allocations had to be based on overall Japanese repatriation needs in all theatres, and that no definite plan could be made until fuller information was available.

147. Disarming and concentration of the Japanese, which had begun in Burma, were carried out in Malaya, Singapore, Siam, Southern F.I.C., and in the Andamans and Nicobars, as soon as S.E.A.C. forces had reoccupied those areas. In Java (and to a far lesser extent in Sumatra) the political situation had compelled me to use armed Japanese for maintaining public order; and in addition to this, the situation in Java had been complicated by the retirement of some 30,000 Japanese into self-imposed internment in the interior, where they were inaccessible. But in the remainder of the N.E.I. and in Borneo, the task of concentration and disarmament had been successfully carried out by the Australian troops before S.E.A.C. forces had taken over.

148. It had been decided in September to move the Japanese from the Andamans and Nicobars, Singapore, and Malaya, and (whenever this became possible) from Java and Sumatra, to two islands in the Riouw Archipelago (south of Singapore) which were conveniently situated as a repatriation base but were sufficiently isolated to be left unguarded without fear of inviting large-scale escapes. This transfer began in October, and was carried out in local Japanese coastal shipping: it relieved us of the need for closely guarding and administering about 150,000 men. By the middle of March 516,000 Japanese, throughout the Command, were ready and waiting for repatriation (including nearly 5,000 captured during the fighting in Burma whom I had accepted from P.O.W. camps in India). The Chiefs of Staff had applied to Washington for facilities for shipping all Japanese out of S.E.A.C. by the end of the year, in view of the heavy cost of maintaining them, and the continued diversion of Allied troops which was necessary for their guarding and administration—as well as of the political difficulties entailed by their retention in Siam, F.I.C., and the N.E.I.

149. On the 6th April, General of the Army MacArthur informed me that he was sending Liberty

ships and other craft, capable of carrying nearly 319,000 in one lift; and that the first of these had already been allocated. These ships began to arrive in South-East Asia in the middle of April, and large-scale repatriation began at once. By the first week in June, of the original 738,000 in the theatre and those brought in from India, 427,000 had been returned to Japan and 148,000 were ready to be returned in the next shipping lifts. Of the remaining 160,000-odd, 25,000 were still in Java, not yet concentrated for evacuation; 20,000 were in Sumatra, guarding coal, oil, and other key installations; 100,000 were being retained in S.E.A.C. (by permission of the Chiefs of Staff) as labour, until the end of the year; 11,000 had died, or deserted, or were otherwise missing. In addition to this, 4,000 were in prison for indiscipline or for War Crimes investigation.

150. When Japan capitulated I realised that the trial of war criminals might prove to be a source of difficulties; and in order to obviate these as far as possible, from the beginning, I had laid down my policy on this matter before leaving Kandy for Singapore.

151. I laid down that the Japanese should be tried on criminal charges only; that is to say, for brutality, etc. It was important that a chain of responsibility should be established; for this was the only way in which individual brutalities could be with logic and justice laid at the door of those who had not personally committed them, but who had certainly authorised and encouraged, if not connived at, their perpetration. Charges of petty brutality must therefore first be laid against individual perpetrators; then, ascending in the hierarchy, those responsible for definite orders which had given rise to these acts should be tried; and finally, those whose overall policy had been implemented by the orders given, and by the acts themselves.

152. At every stage, the guilt of the accused would be very largely established by the fact that his underlings had already been found guilty and convicted. It was, therefore, essential, from the very beginning of this process, that no one should be charged unless there was very strong *prima facie* evidence that he would be convicted, on evidence which could clearly be seen to be irrefutable. In practice, this would mean that all that was necessary for the trial of the lowest class of offender (if, as was bound to happen in some cases, it was impractical to summon witnesses in person), was the sworn depositions of independent witnesses, and unchallenged proof of the accused's identity. If these two requisites could be met he would

be brought to trial; if they could not, he would not be charged—for I considered that nothing would diminish our prestige more than if we appeared to be instigating vindictive trials against individuals of a beaten enemy nation, on charges which even our own courts found themselves unable to substantiate. As a corollary of this, it was decided only to proceed with cases in which a sentence of seven years or more was likely to be inflicted; those who were charged with offences for which this sentence was not likely to be passed were therefore released, together with those against whom the evidence was not sufficiently clear.<sup>1</sup>

#### POSTSCRIPT.

153. The Prime Minister invited me to come to London to attend the Victory Parade on the 8th June; and the Chiefs of Staff instructed me to hand over command of S.E.A.C. to Lieut.-General Stopford,

who became Acting Supreme Allied Commander. On my return to England, the Chiefs of Staff informed me that I would not be required to return to South-East Asia, since the Allied commitments there were now confined to the gradual turning-over of our responsibilities in the N.E.I. to Netherlands forces. For the same reason, they did not propose to relieve me; since Lieut.-General Stopford could act for me, in addition to carrying out his duties as C.-in-C. A.L.F.S.E.A. I renewed my recommendation that the whole of N.E.I. (with the exception of the key-points that we were occupying in Java and Sumatra) should be transferred from S.E.A.C. as from the 1st July, when the Netherlands authorities would resume entire responsibility. But this was not agreed; and the Chiefs of Staff decided later that British/Indian forces should be finally withdrawn from N.E.I. on the 30th November 1946—on which day the South-East Asia Command ceased to exist.

<sup>1</sup> When the Command closed down on the 30th November 1946, out of 146 cases, involving 522 accused, 181 had been

executed and 58 awaited execution; 276 had been sentenced to imprisonment; and 65 had been acquitted.



## APPENDIX H

### GENERAL ORDER NO. 1 TO GENERAL MACARTHUR

15TH AUGUST 1945

*(Issued by the President of the United States of America on behalf of the Allied Powers)*

1. The Japanese Imperial General Headquarters by direction of the Emperor and pursuant to the surrender to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers of all Japanese armed forces by the Emperor, hereby orders all of its Commanders in Japan and abroad to cause the Japanese armed forces under their command to cease hostilities at once, to lay down their arms, to remain in their present locations and to surrender unconditionally to Commanders acting on behalf of the United States, the Republic of China, the United Kingdom and the British Empire and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, as indicated hereafter or as may be further directed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Immediate contact will be made with indicated Commanders or their designated representatives, subject to any change in detail prescribed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and their instructions will be completely and immediately carried out.

(A) The senior Japanese Commander and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces within China (excluding Manchuria), Formosa and French Indo-China north of 16 degrees north latitude shall surrender to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek.

(B) The senior Japanese Commander and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces within Manchuria, Korea north of 38 degrees north latitude and Karafuto shall surrender to the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Union forces in the Far East.

(C) The senior Japanese Commander and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces within the Andamans, the Nicobars, Burma, Thailand (Siam), French Indo-China south of 16 degrees north latitude, Malaya, Borneo, the Netherlands Indies, New Guinea, the Bismarcks and the Solomon Islands shall surrender to the Supreme Allied Commander, South-East Asia Command, or Commanding General, Australian Forces—the exact breakdown between Mountbatten and Australia to be arranged between them. Details of this paragraph will then be prepared by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

(D) The senior Japanese Commander and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces in the Japanese mandated islands, the Ryukyu Islands, the Bonins and

other Pacific Islands shall surrender to the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

(E) The Japanese Imperial General Headquarters, its Senior Commanders and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces in the main islands of Japan, the minor islands adjacent thereto, Korea south of 38 degrees north latitude and the Philippine Islands shall surrender to the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces in the Pacific.

(F) The above indicated Commanders are the only representatives of the Allied Powers empowered to accept surrenders and all surrenders of Japanese forces shall be made only to them or to their representatives.

The Japanese Imperial General Headquarters further orders its Commanders in Japan and abroad to disarm completely all forces of Japan or under Japanese control wherever they may be situated and to deliver intact and in safe and good condition all weapons and equipment at such time and at such place as may be prescribed by the Allied Commanders indicated above. (Pending further instructions the Japanese Police force in the main island of Japan will be exempt from this disarmament provisionally. The police force will remain at their posts and shall be held responsible for the preservation of law and order. The strength and arms of such a police force will be prescribed).

2. The Japanese Imperial General Headquarters shall furnish to the Supreme Commander for Allied Powers within (time limit) of receipt of this order complete information with respect to Japan and all areas under Japanese control as follows:—

(A) Lists of all land, air and anti-aircraft units showing locations and strengths in officers and men.

(B) Lists of all aircraft, military, naval and civil, giving complete information as to the number, type, location and condition of such aircraft.

(C) Lists of all Japanese and Japanese-controlled naval vessels, surface and submarine and auxiliary naval craft, in or out of commission, and under construction, giving their position, condition and movements.

(D) Lists of all Japanese and Japanese-controlled merchant ships of over 100 gross tons, in or out of commission, and under construction, including merchant ships formerly belonging to any of the United Nations which are now in Japanese hands, giving their position, condition and movements.

(E) Complete and detailed information, accompanied by maps, showing locations and layouts of all mines, minefields, and other obstacles to movements by land, sea or air, and safety lanes in connection therewith.

(F) Locations and descriptions of all military installations and establishments, including airfields, seaplane bases, anti-aircraft defences, ports and naval jiggers, storage depots, M.R.P.T. depots, permanent and temporary land and coast fortifications, fortresses and other fortified areas.

(G) Locations of all camps and other places of detention of United Nations P.O.W. and civilian internees.

3. Japanese armed forces and civil aviation authorities will ensure that all Japanese military, naval and civil aircraft remain on the ground, on the water or aboard ships until further notification of the disposition to be made of them.

4. Japanese or Japanese-controlled naval or merchant vessels of all types will be maintained without damage and will undertake no movements pending instructions from the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Vessels at sea will immediately render harmless and throw overboard explosives of all types. Vessels not at sea will immediately remove explosives of all types to safe storage ashore.

5. All Japanese or Japanese controlled military or civil authorities will ensure that:—

(A) All Japanese mines, minefields and other obstacles to movements by land, sea and air, wherever located, be removed according to the instructions of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

(B) All aids to navigation be re-established at once.

(C) All safety lanes be kept open and clearly marked pending accomplishment of (A) above.

6. Responsible Japanese and Japanese-controlled military and civil authorities will hold intact and in good condition pending further instructions from the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers the following:—

(A) All arms, ammunition, explosives, military

equipment, stores and supplies and other implements of war of all kinds and all other war materials (except as specifically prescribed in Section 4 of this order).

(B) All land, water and air transportation and communication facilities and equipment.

(C) All military installations and establishments, including airfields, seaplane bases, anti-aircraft defences, ports and naval bases, storage depots, permanent and temporary land and coast fortifications, fortresses and other fortified areas together with plans and drawings of all such fortifications, installations and establishments.

(D) All factories, steel plants, shops, research institutions, laboratories, testing stations, technical data, patents, plans, drawings and inventions designed or of local produce or to facilitate the production or use of all implements of war and other material, and property used by or intended for use by any military or paramilitary organisation in connection with its operations.

7. The Japanese Imperial General Headquarters shall furnish to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, within (time limit) of receipt of this order, complete lists of all the items specified in paragraphs (A), (B) and (D) of Section 6 above, indicating the number, type and locations of each.

8. The manufacture and distribution of all arms, ammunition and implements of war will cease forthwith.

9. With respect to United Nations P.O.W., and civilian internees in the hands of Japanese or Japanese-controlled authorities:—

(A) The safety and well-being of all United Nations P.O.W. and civilian internees will be scrupulously preserved, to include the administrative and supply service essential to provide adequate food, shelter, clothes and medical care until such responsibility is undertaken by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

(B) Each camp or other place of detention of United Nations P.O.W. and civilian internees, together with its equipment, stores, base records, arms and ammunition will be delivered immediately to the command of the senior officer or the designated representative of P.O.W. and civilian internees.

(C) As directed by the Commander for the Allied Chiefs of Staff, P.O.W. and civilian internees will be transported to places of safety where they can be accepted by the Allied authorities.

(D) The Japanese Imperial General Headquarters will furnish to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, within (time limit) of receipt of this order, complete lists of all United Nations P.O.W. and civilian internees, including their locations.

10. All Japanese and Japanese-controlled Military and civilian authorities shall aid and assist the occupation of Japan and Japanese-controlled areas by the forces of the Allied Powers.

11. The Japanese Imperial General Headquarters and appropriate Japanese officials shall be prepared, on instructions from the Allied occupational Combat

Commanders, to collect and deliver all arms in possession of the Japanese civilian population.

12. This and all subsequent instructions issued by the Commander for the Allied Forces or other Allied Military Authorities will be scrupulously and promptly obeyed by Japanese and Japanese-controlled military and civil officials and private persons. Any delay or failure to comply with the provisions of this or subsequent orders, and any action which the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers determines to be detrimental to the Allied Powers, will incur drastic and summary punishment at the hands of the Allied Military Authorities and the Japanese Government.

## APPENDIX I

### DIRECTIVE TO S.A.C. ON CIVIL AFFAIRS IN MALAYA

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#### DIRECTIVE FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR.

1. Upon the liberation of Malaya or within such territories thereof or adjacent thereto as are under the control of your forces you will set up a military administration for the government of the civil population of the territory. To this end you will assume for yourself by Proclamation such powers as are necessary for the administration of the liberated territories, and will also arrange for the delegation of such powers to the Military Commander designated by you, as General Officer Commanding, Military Forces, Malaya. You will likewise suspend the powers and jurisdiction of all existing courts and tribunals and in their place set up military courts which will derive their authority from your proclamation and deal with all offences committed by the civil population. Such courts will administer the laws in force in Malaya prior to the Japanese occupation modified or supplemented by proclamation as may be necessary for the security of the liberating forces and the maintenance of order.

2. In order to enable you (or the Military Commander designated by you for the purpose) to carry on the Military Administration, a Chief Civil Affairs Officer (Malaya), has been appointed. He will on your behalf and subject to your general directions (or those of the Military Commander) administer the civil population of the liberated territories during the operational phase in the name of the Military Commander, and subsequently in his own name. For all purposes in connection with military administration, the Military Commander referred to above will be formally designated General Officer Commanding, Military Forces, Malaya. He will at no time assume the title of Military Governor.

3. The Chief Civil Affairs Officer, (Malaya), will be provided with a staff of military officers augmented, as may be necessary, by civilians and subordinate military and civil staffs. In so far as is possible, personnel for this staff will be made available by the Colonial Office from officials of the former Government of Malaya, who know the country, the language and the people.

4. During the currency of the military period, military considerations will be paramount. The duties of the military administration [as distinct from those of Chief Civil Affairs Officer, (Malaya), referred to in

paragraph 5 below] will be two-fold. Firstly, in those territories under military administration, Chief Civil Affairs Officer, (Malaya), and the Civil Affairs Officers under his direction will administer the civil population in such a way as to meet the requirements of local Military Commanders and to further the general well-being of the territory. To this end, they will restore law and order among the civil population, distribute essential supplies and advise and act on behalf of the local Commanders in their dealings with the civil population. Secondly, Chief Civil Affairs Officer, (Malaya), will (as soon as military exigencies permit) take the necessary steps to establish as far as possible the essential framework of administration within the liberated territories as territory is uncovered, and lay the foundations of stable future government.

5. The liberation of Malaya necessitates the immediate resumption of His Majesty's Government's responsibility to the peoples of Malaya for their protection and good government. This will, in addition to those measures indicated under paragraph 4 above, call for energetic administrative action and involve a number of activities of government which have no military significance and for which the War Office has no responsibility to Parliament; these matters will be the responsibility of the Colonial Office. It has been decided, therefore, that Chief Civil Affairs Officer, (Malaya), will have a dual responsibility which he will discharge in accordance with the decisions and directions of His Majesty's Government as recorded in the memorandum on this subject which has been communicated to you separately.

6. In furtherance of your function under paragraph 4 you will during the period of Military Administration be responsible, subject to operational requirements, for the provision of supplies for the needs of the civil population, and for local industries and agriculture to a level necessary to prevent disease and unrest and to secure the maximum assistance for the progressive restoration of the territory. In addition you should render such assistance as is feasible to enable those natural resources of the territory as are urgently required to meet the general world shortage to be obtained. Sufficient supplies will be demanded for six months for the whole of Malaya. In addition you will demand additional supplies in the form of Inducement Goods for military labour employed directly for military purposes should you consider it necessary to

do so to ensure proper supplies of labour. Other necessary supplies for the civil population of the liberated territory during the period of Military Administration may be procured by the Colonial Office and for these you will provide such transportation and other facilities within your Command as may be possible in the circumstances of the case. All supplies for the civil needs of the territory for the periods following the six months' military provisioning are being procured through civil channels as a Colonial Office responsibility and for these, also, you will provide such transportation and other facilities within your Command as may be possible.

7. It is the policy of His Majesty's Government that the Administration of the territories in question should be transferred to the responsibility of the Colonial Office as soon as possible as and in so far as conditions are such as to enable the latter to function. It will be for you to recommend when and in what areas such transfer can take place without embarrassment to military needs bearing in mind that so far as the Malayan mainland areas are concerned (excluding

Singapore) it is likely to be impracticable for the Colonial Office to take over responsibility until the whole of that area can be so transferred. Subject to military exigencies, the Government of the civil population during the period of Military Administration in Malaya will be carried on in the various administrative spheres in accordance with the long-term policy which the Colonial Office has in mind to pursue when it resumes responsibility for the civil administration of the territory. In order that you may be aware of this policy, and be in a position to pursue it so far as circumstances and military considerations permit, you will be supplied from time to time with long-term policy directives framed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies and transmitted to you through the War Office.

8. If, in your judgment, a departure from these or any subsequent instructions is required for urgent and over-riding military reasons, you have discretion to authorise action accordingly and you will submit a report on the matter as soon as possible.

(Sd.) J. J. LAWSON

## APPENDIX J

### PROCLAMATION NO. 1: MILITARY ADMINISTRATION (MALAYA).

15TH AUGUST 1945

Whereas by reason of military necessity and for the prevention and suppression of disorder and the maintenance of public safety it is necessary to place the territories of the Settlements of Singapore, Penang and Malacca, all islands and places forming part thereof and all British waters adjacent thereto, and the Malaya States of Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, Pahang, Johore, Kedah, Kelantan, Trengganu and Perlis, all islands forming part of such States and the territorial waters thereof (hereinafter called Malaya) under military administration:

Now, therefore, I, Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, Knight Grand Cross of the Royal Victorian Order, Knight Commander of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath, Companion of the Distinguished Service Order, Personal Aide-de-Camp to His Majesty the King, Honorary Lieutenant-General and Air Marshal, Supreme Allied Commander, South-East Asia, hereby proclaim as follows:—

#### ESTABLISHMENT OF A MILITARY ADMINISTRATION.

1. A Military Administration to be called the British Military Administration is hereby established throughout such areas of Malaya as are at any given time under the control of Forces under my command and shall continue only so long as I consider it to be required by military necessity.

#### ASSUMPTION OF POWERS AND JURISDICTION.

2. I hereby assume for myself and my successors full judicial, legislative, executive and administrative powers and responsibilities and conclusive jurisdiction over all persons and property throughout such areas of Malaya as are at any given time under the control of the Forces under my command.

#### DELEGATION.

3. Subject always to any orders and directions which I may issue from time to time, I delegate to the General Officer Commanding Military Forces, Malaya, all the powers, responsibilities and jurisdiction assumed by me, and such General Officer Commanding is authorised to delegate such powers, responsibilities and jurisdiction as he may deem necessary to any Officer under his command and to empower such officer further to delegate any of such powers, responsibilities and jurisdiction.

#### ORDERS TO BE OBEYED.

4. All persons will obey promptly all orders given

by me or under my authority and must refrain from all acts which impede the Forces under my command or are helpful to the enemy, from all acts of violence, and from any act calculated to disturb public order in any way.

#### EXISTING LAWS TO BE RESPECTED.

5. (i) Subject to the provisions of any Proclamation of the British Military Administration and in so far as military exigencies permit—

(a) all laws and customs existing immediately prior to the Japanese occupation will be respected:—  
Provided that such of the existing laws as the Chief Civil Affairs Officer considers it is practicable from time to time to administer during the period of military administration will be administered;

(b) all rights and properties will be respected:—  
Provided that rights and properties acquired during the Japanese occupation may be subject to investigation and to such action as justice requires.

(ii) With regard to paragraph (a) of sub-section (i), the inhabitants of the said territories are advised to consult the nearest Civil Affairs Officer if in doubt as to whether any existing law is being administered.

#### SUSPENSION OF COURTS.

6. All Courts and tribunals, other than military courts established under my authority, are hereby suspended and deprived of all authority and jurisdiction until authorised by me to re-open.

#### REVOCATION OF JAPANESE MILITARY ADMINISTRATION PROCLAMATIONS.

7. It is hereby declared that all Proclamations and legislative enactments of whatever kind issued by or under the authority of the Japanese Military Administration shall cease to have any effect.

#### SHORT TITLE.

8. This Proclamation may be cited as the Military Administration Proclamation.

Signed at Kandy, this fifteenth day of August, 1945.

(Sd.) LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN,  
Supreme Allied Commander,  
South-East Asia.



## APPENDIX K

### S.A.C.'s POLICY FOR MILITARY ADMINISTRATION IN MALAYA

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#### EXTRACTS FROM A DIRECTIVE BY THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER

1. The setting-up of a Military Administration under my authority is the only practicable method by which the civil population can be governed during military operations in Malaya and in the period immediately following the cessation of hostilities, since only the liberating forces can provide immediately the services and resources necessary to bring security and help to the civil population after the ejection of the enemy. But the Military Administration is only a temporary expedient, and ordinary civil government will be restored as early as possible. These facts must be explained to the populace by all available means in order that their full co-operation may be secured.

2. The aims of the British Military Administration will be as follows:—

- (a) To restore law and order among the civil population.
- (b) To provide supplies to the civil population on such a scale as will prevent disease and unrest.
- (c) To organise and mobilise the human and material resources of the country in the interests of the general war effort.
- (d) To restore the morale of the people and their confidence in the cause of the United Nations by, *inter alia*—
  - (i) The repair of the ravages of war in the liberated territory.
  - (ii) The rehabilitation of the morale and material welfare of its inhabitants.
- (e) To prepare the way for the early resumption of civil government.

3. The peoples of Malaya received a rude shock when, by reason of a shattering military defeat, Great Britain was unable to continue the protection it had afforded them for many years. In a state of bewilderment and uncertainty they were left to the control of a powerful Asiatic people who made attractive promises of future liberty and prosperity, and who, by insidious propaganda, sought to destroy the confidence of the people in the might and justice of the British Empire—a confidence already shaken by the disruption of its fighting forces before their very eyes.

4. Although the nine States of Malaya were under His Majesty's protection, their Malay inhabitants are not British subjects, but owe allegiance to their re-

spective Sultans. The remaining inhabitants of the States are largely Indians and Chinese, and of the latter only a few possess British nationality.

5. Despite diversity of race and creed, however, the inhabitants of Malaya had a respect for British administration which no amount of false promises by the victorious Japanese Army could shake; and our information is that the inhabitants have remained loyal to the British cause and will welcome our return. In liberating Malaya, therefore, every member of the British Forces is responsible for ensuring that the peoples of the country are met and approached with understanding and sympathy. In this way, and in this way only, can their confidence in British good faith, fair dealing and impartial justice be retained.

6. The first guiding principle to be observed is that no person shall suffer on account of political opinions honestly held, whether now or in the past—even if these may have been anti-British—but only on account of previous crimes against the criminal law or actions repugnant to humanity. His Majesty's Government's policy regarding the handling of persons suspected of subversive activities is being issued in the form of a directive; and a memorandum is being circulated, setting out a liberal policy towards Public Servants who have remained at their posts during the Japanese occupation.

7. I wish to be personally assured that no case occurs during the period of Military Administration in which the Administration could possibly be accused of political victimisation. The following directions will be observed:—

- (i) The circumstances of any prosecution (resulting in a sentence other than death) which might be regarded as having any political implications will be reported in writing immediately to Headquarters, Supreme Allied Commander, South-East Asia.
- (ii) Before confirmation of a sentence of death in any such prosecution, a signal reporting the circumstances with a suitable recommendation will be sent to Headquarters, Supreme Allied Commander, South-East Asia, and the Supreme Allied Commander's comments will be awaited before the sentence of death is confirmed.
- (iii) No proclamation shall be issued which has the effect of increasing the maximum sentence for

an offence existing immediately before the Japanese occupation, without the prior approval of the Supreme Allied Commander.

8. My assumption of full legislative, executive, judicial and administrative powers for the Military Administration of Malaya means that the Civil Affairs Staff is required and authorised directly to undertake the government of the country. Civil Affairs Officers, have, therefore, direct and complete responsibility for administrative action in all fields in contra-distinction to the position occupied by British Government officials in the States prior to the Japanese invasion—especially in the Unfederated Malay States.

9. This fundamental difference in function and responsibility during the period of Military Administration must be carefully explained to all Civil Affairs Officers; it is the essence of the conception of Military Administration, and the chain of responsibility from myself downwards places the full onus on Civil Affairs Officers in the field, to ensure that the orders and requirements of the Military Administration are faithfully and fully carried out.

10. During the Japanese occupation, the British constitutional arrangements of Malaya were necessarily in a state of suspension; and my immediate establishment of Military Administration on the liberation of the country will have the legal effect of continuing the suspension of the constitution. Consequently, Legislative, Executive and State Councils remain in abeyance, and the established Civil Courts will likewise be replaced throughout the country by

Military Courts, supervised and staffed by the Civil Affairs personnel. In the same way, the operation of the various agreements with the Rulers will be regarded as remaining in a state of suspension until my Military Administration is terminated.

11. The emphasis laid above on the direct responsibility of the Civil Affairs Staff is not to be taken as a direction to impose a régime of absolute autocracy. On the contrary, it must be the policy of the Military Administration to exercise its powers and discharge its responsibilities, in so far as this may prove possible, with the co-operation and support of the local population.

12. In the first place, since the full co-operation of the people can only be secured if they understand the reasons underlying the orders and laws they are expected to obey, the public must be taken into the confidence of the Military Administration, who must fully explain, by all available means, the urgency and need for the measures which it is necessary to take for the amelioration of the lot of the population and for the prosecution of the war effort. Secondly, the setting-up of a Military Administration does not preclude the adoption of a considerable degree of democratic machinery appropriate to the local conditions for the purpose of carrying on the government of the country. The more the people themselves can be associated with the mechanism of government, the more successful and effective it will be. It is therefore my direction that a liberal and enlightened policy shall be followed by the Military Administration.

## ANNEXURE 12

### ALLIED MISSIONS TO H.Q., S.A.C.S.E.A.

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#### I—THE CHINESE MILITARY MISSION.

##### ORIGIN AND COMPOSITION.

1. In the middle of February, 1944, the Chinese National Council, with the approval of the Generalissimo, appointed Major-General Feng Yee, the former Deputy Chief of Staff of the Chinese Expeditionary Forces in Burma, to form and lead a Chinese Military Mission to H.Q., S.A.C.S.E.A. The Mission was organised as follows:—

- Chief Liaison Officer;
- Navy, Army and Air Liaison Officers (from major to colonel, or equivalent);
- Secretary (major or lieutenant-colonel);
- Assistant Adjutant (lieutenant or captain);
- Signal Officers (not above major).

##### OBJECTS.

2. The objects of this Mission were:—
- (a) To exchange ideas and opinions about the war as between the Chinese Military authorities and senior staff officers of H.Q., S.A.C.S.E.A.
  - (b) To discuss the planning of all operations against the enemy in the South-East Asia theatre, with particular regard to issues affecting the China theatre, in order that periodical reports might be submitted to the higher authorities of Northern Combat Area Command and S.E.A.C. for information and reference.
  - (c) To exchange information about the political and economic situation which throughout had a bearing on the conduct of operations against the common enemy.

##### MAJOR-GENERAL FENG YEE'S TOUR.

3. After his appointment as Head of the Mission had been announced, Major-General Feng Yee proceeded to Calcutta on the 1st March 1944 with Captain Y. L. Tsung, Chinese Navy, the Naval Liaison Officer; with the Secretary and Assistant Adjutant and three Signal Officers. The party arrived at Calcutta on the 9th March and left for New Delhi on the 23rd. Major-General Feng Yee paid his first visit to the Supreme Allied Commander on the 25th.

4. On the 4th April Major-General Feng Yee went on a tour of the Arakan front, accompanied by Captain Tsung and one other officer. He visited Lieut.-General Slim, Lieut.-General Christison and

Major-General Festing (G.O.C., 36 British Division). On the 8th the party left for Calcutta, and from there went on to Bombay, where they visited the Combined Training Centre on the 10th. While they were inspecting the dockyard on the afternoon of the 14th, Captain Tsung was unfortunately killed in the explosion that day in Victoria Dock. He was replaced by Commander J. F. Kao.

##### ATTACHMENT OF THE MISSION TO H.Q., S.A.C.S.E.A.

5. On the 30th April all the officers of the Mission, led by Major-General Feng Yee, arrived at Kandy and reported at H.Q., S.A.C.S.E.A.

##### VISITS AND TOURS BY MEMBERS OF THE MISSION.

6. Apart from their routine liaison work and study of the war situation, officers of the Mission frequently went on tours arranged by Headquarters. It was intended in this way to promote a deeper mutual understanding between the Allied Forces.

7. In August 1944 Major-General Feng Yee visited the Imphal battle area with Major L. S. Chen, Chinese Air Force, and spoke to many high-ranking officers. He was greatly impressed by the stern fighting qualities of the British soldier. In December of the same year he was invited by the Supreme Allied Commander to accompany Lieut.-General Leese, the newly-appointed Commander-in-Chief, A.L.F.S.E.A., to Myitkyina, in order to introduce him to all the Chinese Commanding Generals in Burma.

8. In March 1945 Major-General Feng Yee accompanied the Supreme Allied Commander to Chungking; and in June he was invited, together with Commander Kao, to attend the Victory Parade at Rangoon. In September 1945 he represented China at the surrender of the Japanese Expeditionary Forces of the Southern Regions at Singapore.



#### II—THE NETHERLANDS STAFF SECTION.

##### ORIGIN.

9. The Netherlands Staff Section was formed after a visit by Vice-Admiral (later Admiral) Helfrich, Commander-in-Chief, Netherlands Forces in the Far

East, to the Supreme Allied Commander in November 1943 in New Delhi. At that time there was a possibility of operations against the N.E.I. in the near future.

#### COMPOSITION.

10. Colonel D. C. Buurman van Vreeden, General Staff, Royal Netherlands Indies Army, who was then Netherlands Liaison Officer with G.H.Q.(I). at New Delhi, was appointed Senior Military Staff Officer to the Section on the 14th December 1943. At the meeting in November 1943, the Supreme Allied Commander and the Netherlands Ambassador to China, Mr. A. H. J. Lovink, had agreed that Colonel Buurman van Vreeden, who was also Netherlands Military Attaché at Chungking, should provisionally retain this appointment; he normally spent periods of one month at Chungking and a fortnight with H.Q., S.A.C.S.E.A., alternately. He was relieved of his duties at Chungking in August 1944 and posted permanently to Kandy on the 7th September 1944.

11. Captain J. P. H. Perks, Royal Netherlands Navy, and Commander K. J. A. Meester, R.N.N. (Air), were appointed Naval and Air Staff Officers respectively on the 29th December 1943, Captain Perks being senior officer of the Section.

12. The section moved with H.Q., S.A.C.S.E.A., to Kandy in April 1944. Captain J. F. van Poeteren, Royal Netherlands Army, who was Military Assistant with the Section in New Delhi, remained there as Rear Link and Netherlands Liaison Officer at G.H.Q.(I.).

#### DUTIES OF THE SECTION.

13. According to the instructions issued by Vice-Admiral Helfrich in the interests of secrecy regarding future operations, the Netherlands Staff Section had to be prepared to take part in the planning of operations without being under any obligation to consult him. Literally the instruction read: "You will have no contact with us except for remaining Netherlands subjects". At the first meeting with the Supreme Allied Commander, it was directed that the Section should only take part in the planning of operations against the N.E.I. or operations in which parts of the N.E.I. were involved. Since operations against the N.E.I. were postponed, the activities of the officers of the Section consisted mainly of Intelligence and Liaison. The Section contributed to several topographical reports by I.S.T.D. (S.E.A.C.). Colonel Buurman van Vreeden was later appointed as Vice-Admiral Helfrich's personal representative with 'P' Division in co-ordinating clandestine activities affecting the N.E.I.

14. As operations in South-East Asia developed and future planning became more and more occupied with problems concerning the re-occupation of the N.E.I., the activities of the Section gradually changed from Liaison and Intelligence matters to planning, and on several occasions the Section produced Notes on proposed plans for operations against the N.E.I.—and also on possible targets in the Islands. The activities of the Section increased considerably after the surrender of Germany, and still more after that of Japan. Restrictions regarding communication between the Netherlands Staff Section and H.Q., Netherlands Forces, in the Far East were of course lifted after the surrender of Japan. The Section took part in the planning for re-occupation of the N.E.I.

#### VISITS AND TOURS BY MEMBERS OF THE SECTION.

15. Apart from their representational activities the officers of the Section visited the Allied Forces on several occasions. Captain Perks frequently went to sea with the fleet and was present at the attacks on Port Blair, Sabang, Medan, Belawan Deli, Pangkalan Brandan and Pangkalan Soesoeh; and the assault on Rangoon. Commander Meester was present at an attack on Medan and paid a two weeks' visit to the air forces in Burma; and after the surrender he joined H.M.S. *Cumberland*, on her way to Batavia.

16. The Netherlands Government was represented by Captain Perks at the Parade and Surrender at Rangoon, and by Colonel (later Major-General) Buurman van Vreeden at the Singapore surrender ceremony, in place of Admiral Helfrich.



### III—THE FRENCH MILITARY MISSION.

#### COMPOSITION.

17. The Mission consisted of:—

Lieut.-General Blaizot, Head of Mission; who was also Commander-in-Chief-designate of the French Expeditionary Forces in the Far East (F.E.F.E.O.);

Commander (later Captain) Doignon, French Navy, Chief of Staff to Lieut.-General Blaizot;

Major de Langlade, Political Adviser to Lieut.-General Blaizot;

A light echelon from H.Q., F.E.F.E.O.,—including about ten officers.

**ARRIVAL.**

18. Lieut.-General Blaizot disembarked at Colombo from the French sloop *Dumont D'Urville*, arrived at Kandy on the 26th October 1944, and went to report to the Supreme Allied Commander, bringing with him a letter from General de Gaulle.

**OBJECTS.**

19. The objects of the Mission were:—

- (a) to control the French military organisations then existing in India;
- (b) to prepare for French forces to come into action in S.E.A.C. or eventually in any other theatre in the Far East;
- (c) to keep in touch with the Head of the French Indo-China Resistance, to help him in his under-

ground work, consult with him over the planning of future operations, and to rally the outside support necessary for such operations.

**ACTIVITIES OF THE MISSION DURING 1945.**

20. In the course of 1945 the strength of the Mission was gradually doubled. In June 1945 Group Captain Fay, French Air Force, was appointed Assistant to the Head of the Mission, and later Deputy Head of the Mission; this was until August 1945, when General Leclerc arrived at Kandy to relieve Lieut.-General Blaizot.

21. General Leclerc and his staff helped to prepare the plans for the re-occupation of Southern French Indo-China and he later took over command of the French Forces in French Indo-China.



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